That is not a correct statement of my position.I disagree with the majority opinion of SCOTUS in the Heller case in the manner in which they re-interpreted the Second Amendment and perform a judicial sleight of hand to get around the Miller case. I go with the four other SCOTUS justices who dissented as their opinion seems to accord both with a rational interpretation of the wording of the Second Amendment and acknowledges past SCOTUS case law on this point.
Wetcoaster has no professional knowledge on the US constitution because he believes the second amendment empowers government to bear arms rather than citizens. He isn't the only one either. Wetcoaster is also on the wrong side of SCOTUS judge rulings (until a few conservative judges get replaced) yet most Americans but you and who you agree with are the crazy ones eh? Funny how you respect the Constitution only when you agree with certain parts and the rest be damned. That's why your ilk will not be taken seriously or be given much clout regardless of how powerful or weak the NRA lobby is. Obvious knee jerk is obvious.
The question presented by this case is not whether the Second Amendment protects a “collective right” or an “individual right.” Surely it protects a right that can be enforced by individuals. But a conclusion that the Second Amendment protects an individual right does not tell us anything about the scope of that right.
Guns are used to hunt, for self-defense, to commit crimes, for sporting activities, and to perform military duties. The Second Amendment plainly does not protect the right to use a gun to rob a bank; it is equally clear that it does encompass the right to use weapons for certain military purposes. Whether it also protects the right to possess and use guns for nonmilitary purposes like hunting and personal self-defense is the question presented by this case. The text of the Amendment, its history, and our decision in United States v. Miller, 307 U. S. 174 (1939) , provide a clear answer to that question.
The Second Amendment was adopted to protect the right of the people of each of the several States to maintain a well-regulated militia. It was a response to concerns raised during the ratification of the Constitution that the power of Congress to disarm the state militias and create a national standing army posed an intolerable threat to the sovereignty of the several States. Neither the text of the Amendment nor the arguments advanced by its proponents evidenced the slightest interest in limiting any legislature’s authority to regulate private civilian uses of firearms. Specifically, there is no indication that the Framers of the Amendment intended to enshrine the common-law right of self-defense in the Constitution.
In 1934, Congress enacted the National Firearms Act, the first major federal firearms law. Upholding a conviction under that Act, this Court held that, “[i]n the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a ‘shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length’ at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument.” Miller, 307 U. S., at 178. The view of the Amendment we took in Miller—that it protects the right to keep and bear arms for certain military purposes, but that it does not curtail the Legislature’s power to regulate the nonmilitary use and ownership of weapons—is both the most natural reading of the Amendment’s text and the interpretation most faithful to the history of its adoption.
Since our decision in Miller, hundreds of judges have relied on the view of the Amendment we endorsed there; we ourselves affirmed it in 1980. See Lewis v. United States, 445 U. S. 55 , n. 8 (1980). No new evidence has surfaced since 1980 supporting the view that the Amendment was intended to curtail the power of Congress to regulate civilian use or misuse of weapons. Indeed, a review of the drafting history of the Amendment demonstrates that its Framers rejected proposals that would have broadened its coverage to include such uses.~Justice Stevens
with whom Justice Souter, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer joined in dissent
Justice Breyer agreed with the dissenting opinion of Justice Stevens but went even farther:
We must decide whether a District of Columbia law that prohibits the possession of handguns in the home violates the Second Amendment . The majority, relying upon its view that the Second Amendment seeks to protect a right of personal self-defense, holds that this law violates that Amendment. In my view, it does not.
The majority’s conclusion is wrong for two independent reasons. The first reason is that set forth by Justice Stevens—namely, that the Second Amendment protects militia-related, not self-defense-related, interests. These two interests are sometimes intertwined. To assure 18th-century citizens that they could keep arms for militia purposes would necessarily have allowed them to keep arms that they could have used for self-defense as well. But self-defense alone, detached from any militia-related objective, is not the Amendment’s concern.
The second independent reason is that the protection the Amendment provides is not absolute. The Amendment permits government to regulate the interests that it serves. Thus, irrespective of what those interests are—whether they do or do not include an independent interest in self-defense—the majority’s view cannot be correct unless it can show that the District’s regulation is unreasonable or inappropriate in Second Amendment terms. This the majority cannot do. Is it your position that those four dissenting justices of the SCOTUS do not understand the US Constitution? Before the Heller case it was not an issue given the way in which numerous courts had for decades applied the last major SCOTUS ruling on the right to bear arms - United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
It has only become problematical since 2008 with the interpretation that the majority placed on the Second Amendment and the way in which they re-interpreted Miller.