UKNuck96
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Depends on the culture - in the UK people do exactly that with football games. 3pm kickoff is standard, most sports start in the early afternoon. however I’m well aware that’s the UK and games in NA are often evening events.
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Elias Pettersson | Quinn Hughes - Contract Discussion Thread
UKNuck96 replied to Bertuzzipunch's topic in Canucks Talk
That triggers me on so many levels -
The battle of the EV Trucks. Who will win?
UKNuck96 replied to Ghostsof1915's topic in Off-Topic General
Depends on the company I guess. But UK and Canadian markets are massively different. Uk runs on transit van or connect size rather than pickups. A few of the places I work alongside have already transitioned to full EV. They plug them all in a night at the depot and they are used the next day. They have a floating stock in case of any issues. but I guess it’s easier in the uk due to higher fuel prices and tax breaks push the case for EVs more, and the majority of pickup or small trucks are urban driving. there are also more hydrogen powered larger vehicles coming into service over here as well and I do think the mix will complement each other -
If it was a green sheen then it’s fine, it does this because the nitrogen used in the processing /packing can react with the myoglobin
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Elias Pettersson | Quinn Hughes - Contract Discussion Thread
UKNuck96 replied to Bertuzzipunch's topic in Canucks Talk
While I don’t agree with all of the proposal outlined, it’s actually reasonably thought out. at the moment the higher threshold and salary inflation only hurts those in the middle. It means that you pay the top tier and then have scraps to plug the gaps for lower wages. Reducing the value at the top and brining the base up would give a lot more to the majority of the players. It would also allow for a wider spread of salary meaning lower tier players would likely see not just a minimum contract increase but a second and third contract increase as well rather then getting squeezed. there may be an appetite for that in the NHLPA because if you look at the fine situation and the debacle that is supplementary discipline, the fines are set in the CBA and really do not deter a player from being dangerous. The NHLPA could stamp out goo wet by agreeing the punishing values. However that hurts the majority of their base so they won’t do it. That’s why lowering the tiers at the top provided enough was redistributed towards to lower end may actually be liked. -
Elias Pettersson | Quinn Hughes - Contract Discussion Thread
UKNuck96 replied to Bertuzzipunch's topic in Canucks Talk
You have to remember though that players are people and not commodities even though they get traded. -
Elias Pettersson | Quinn Hughes - Contract Discussion Thread
UKNuck96 replied to Bertuzzipunch's topic in Canucks Talk
Sounds like the recent NIbtax rise in the Uk - the young pay for the old who get their cake and then eat the youngsters cake as well -
Elias Pettersson | Quinn Hughes - Contract Discussion Thread
UKNuck96 replied to Bertuzzipunch's topic in Canucks Talk
Is the issue escrow and they are pushing up baseline salary demands to cover for it? -
Elias Pettersson | Quinn Hughes - Contract Discussion Thread
UKNuck96 replied to Bertuzzipunch's topic in Canucks Talk
Teams in the east having their farm close by I get running a shortened roster, as the team is never likely far away. but how many fixtures overlap for the Vancouver and Abby teams? How often will both teams be in the same town? -
Elias Pettersson | Quinn Hughes - Contract Discussion Thread
UKNuck96 replied to Bertuzzipunch's topic in Canucks Talk
Should we be holding our breath or not? -
It’s about making the right entry for the play, if you get a turnover a quick dump in can get you behind the D and play a puck into the slot from behind the net. if they are already set and clogging up the zone it can be a way of getting the puck past the bodies forcing the opposition to breakup their zone clogging. if you go for controlled entries everytime teams will just stack the neutral zone and play a trap system. a dump a chase shouldn’t be an aimless fire in though, and I hate the dump and line change. A proper dump in should be either fired in so hard it rings around for the opposite winger or more conventionally targets a specific D man who you then pressure and get a quick turnover. the philosophy is based on the idea that easiest time to retrieve the puck is when the opponents have just got it, and it’s not fully under control. would I like to see high speed slick dangles and controlled entries for sure, but the reality is there is a reason why the frequency of these is lower than dump and chase .
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The whole situation at the airport is a mess, I don’t understand how it takes so long to process people, the US forces have been turning away British nationals with the correct papers, a set of Ugandans working for a US aid agency had been processed and were due to board a plane that was privately charged for them from their agency HQ in Washington were denied boarding by after processing, causing the plane to leave empty. the whole withdrawal all the way to today has been botched. it’s an absolute mess.
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Analytics are not the be all and end all they are a means to showcase a picture, and by using multiple sources one can start to piece together a bigger picture. people who focus purely one element are like the blind men describing an elephant
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Is America had focused less on making another America in Central Asia and looked to put a government structure together than had elements of power sharing and making sure that all ethnic groups had a stake in the government it probably wouldn’t have got to this mess but it has. what is interesting is that from the French and British side the priority is getting people out for the Americans it’s hitting the leaving date. when the USA the rest will have to go, because even if the numbers were there the intelligence is controlled by the USA which cannot just be handed overn
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[Official] Seattle Kraken becomes NHL’s 32nd team
UKNuck96 replied to -Vintage Canuck-'s topic in General Hockey Discussion
Pretty cool, for some reason I assumed the centre circle logos would be a pre printed graphic not painted in. -
Tony Blair: Why We Must Not Abandon the People of Afghanistan – For Their Sakes and Ours Commentary Posted on: 21st August 2021 Tony Blair Former Prime Minister of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Executive Chairman of the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change email print The abandonment of Afghanistan and its people is tragic, dangerous, unnecessary, not in their interests and not in ours. In the aftermath of the decision to return Afghanistan to the same group from which the carnage of 9/11 arose, and in a manner that seems almost designed to parade our humiliation, the question posed by allies and enemies alike is: has the West lost its strategic will? Meaning: is it able to learn from experience, think strategically, define our interests strategically and on that basis commit strategically? Is long term a concept we are still capable of grasping? Is the nature of our politics now inconsistent with the assertion of our traditional global leadership role? And do we care? As the leader of our country when we took the decision to join the United States in removing the Taliban from power – and who saw the high hopes we had of what we could achieve for the people and the world subside under the weight of bitter reality – I know better than most how difficult the decisions of leadership are, and how easy it is to be critical and how hard to be constructive. Almost 20 years ago, following the slaughter of 3,000 people on US soil on 11 September, the world was in turmoil. The attacks were organised out of Afghanistan by al-Qaeda, an Islamist terrorist group given protection and assistance by the Taliban. We forget this now, but the world was spinning on its axis. We feared further attacks, possibly worse. The Taliban were given an ultimatum: yield up the al-Qaeda leadership or be removed from power so that Afghanistan could not be used for further attacks. They refused. We felt there was no safer alternative for our security than keeping our word. We held out the prospect, backed by substantial commitment, of turning Afghanistan from a failed terror state into a functioning democracy on the mend. It may have been a misplaced ambition, but it was not an ignoble one. There is no doubt that in the years that followed we made mistakes, some serious. But the reaction to our mistakes has been, unfortunately, further mistakes. Today we are in a mood that seems to regard the bringing of democracy as a utopian delusion and intervention, virtually of any sort, as a fool’s errand. The world is now uncertain of where the West stands because it is so obvious that the decision to withdraw from Afghanistan in this way was driven not by grand strategy but by politics. We didn't need to do it. We chose to do it. We did it in obedience to an imbecilic political slogan about ending “the forever wars”, as if our engagement in 2021 was remotely comparable to our commitment 20 or even ten years ago, and in circumstances in which troop numbers had declined to a minimum and no allied soldier had lost their life in combat for 18 months. We did it in the knowledge that though worse than imperfect, and though immensely fragile, there were real gains over the past 20 years. And for anyone who disputes that, read the heartbreaking laments from every section of Afghan society as to what they fear will now be lost. Gains in living standards, education particularly of girls, gains in freedom. Not nearly what we hoped or wanted. But not nothing. Something worth defending. Worth protecting. We did it when the sacrifices of our troops had made those fragile gains our duty to preserve. We did it when the February 2020 agreement, itself replete with concessions to the Taliban, by which the US agreed to withdraw if the Taliban negotiated a broad-based government and protected civilians, had been violated daily and derisively. We did it with every jihadist group around the world cheering. Russia, China and Iran will see and take advantage. Anyone given commitments by Western leaders will understandably regard them as unstable currency. We did it because our politics seemed to demand it. And that’s the worry of our allies and the source of rejoicing in those who wish us ill. They think Western politics is broken. Unsurprisingly therefore friends and foes ask: is this a moment when the West is in epoch-changing retreat? I can't believe we are in such retreat, but we are going to have to give tangible demonstration that we are not. This demands an immediate response in respect of Afghanistan. And then measured and clear articulation of where we stand for the future. We must evacuate and give sanctuary to those to whom we have responsibility – those Afghans who helped us, stood by us and have a right to demand we stand by them. There must be no repetition of arbitrary deadlines. We have a moral obligation to keep at it until all those who need to be are evacuated. And we should do so not grudgingly but out of a deep sense of humanity and responsibility. We need then to work out a means of dealing with the Taliban and exerting maximum pressure on them. This is not as empty as it seems. We have given up much of our leverage, but we retain some. The Taliban will face very difficult decisions and likely divide deeply over them. The country, its finances and public-sector workforce are significantly dependent on aid notably from the US, Japan, the UK and others. The average age of the population is 18. A majority of Afghans have known freedom and not known the Taliban regime. They will not all conform quietly. The UK, as the current G7 chair, should convene a Contact Group of the G7 and other key nations, and commit to coordinating help to the Afghan people and holding the new regime to account. NATO – which has had 8,000 troops present in Afghanistan alongside the US – and Europe should be brought fully into cooperation under this grouping. We need to draw up a list of incentives, sanctions and actions we can take, including to protect the civilian population so the Taliban understand their actions will have consequences. This is urgent. The disarray of the past weeks needs to be replaced by something resembling coherence, and with a plan that is credible and realistic. But then we must answer that overarching question. What are our strategic interests and are we prepared any longer to commit to upholding them? Compare the Western position with that of President Putin. When the Arab Spring convulsed the Middle East and North Africa toppling regime after regime, he perceived that Russia’s interests were at stake. In particular, in Syria, he believed that Russia needed Assad to stay in power. While the West hesitated and then finally achieved the worst of all worlds – refusing to negotiate with Assad, but not doing anything to remove him, even when he used chemical weapons against his own people – Putin committed. He has spent ten years in open-ended commitment. And though he was intervening to prop up a dictatorship and we were intervening to suppress one, he, along with the Iranians, secured his goal. Likewise, though we removed the Qaddafi government in Libya, it is Russia, not us, who has influence over the future. Afghanistan was hard to govern all through the 20 years of our time there. And of course, there were mistakes and miscalculations. But we shouldn’t dupe ourselves into thinking it was ever going to be anything other than tough, when there was an internal insurgency combining with external support – in this case, Pakistan – to destabilise the country and thwart its progress. The Afghan army didn’t hold up once US support was cancelled, but 60,000 Afghan soldiers gave their lives, and any army would have suffered a collapse in morale when effective air support vital for troops in the field was scuttled by the overnight withdrawal of maintenance. There was endemic corruption in government, but there were also good people doing good work to the benefit of the people. Read the excellent summary of what we got right and wrong from General Petraeus in his New Yorker interview. It often dashed our hopes, but it was never hopeless. Despite everything, if it mattered strategically, it was worth persevering provided that the cost was not inordinate and here it wasn't. If it matters, you go through the pain. Even when you are rightly disheartened, you can't lose heart completely. Your friends need to feel it and your foes need to know it. “If it matters.” So: does it? Is what is happening in Afghanistan part of a picture that concerns our strategic interests and engages them profoundly? Some would say no. We have not had another attack on the scale of 9/11, though no-one knows whether that is because of what we did post 9/11 or despite it. You could say that terrorism remains a threat but not one that occupies the thoughts of a lot of our citizens, certainly not to the degree in the years following 9/11. You could see different elements of jihadism as disconnected, with local causes and containable with modern intelligence. I would still argue that even if this were right and the action in removing the Taliban in November 2001 was unnecessary, the decision to withdraw was wrong. But it wouldn’t make this a turning point in geopolitics. But let me make the alternative case – that the Taliban is part of a bigger picture that should concern us strategically. The 9/11 attack exploded into our consciousness because of its severity and horror. But the motivation for such an atrocity arose from an ideology many years in development. I will call it “Radical Islam” for want of a better term. As a research paper shortly to be published by my Institute shows, this ideology in different forms, and with varying degrees of extremism, has been almost 100 years in gestation. Its essence is the belief that Muslim people are disrespected and disadvantaged because they are oppressed by outside powers and their own corrupt leadership, and that the answer lies in Islam returning to its roots, creating a state based not on nations but on religion, with society and politics governed by a strict and fundamentalist view of Islam. It is the turning of the religion of Islam into a political ideology and, of necessity, an exclusionary and extreme one because in a multi-faith and multicultural world, it holds there is only one true faith and we should all conform to it. Over the past decades and well before 9/11, it was gaining in strength. The 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution and its echo in the failed storming of the Grand Mosque in Mecca in late 1979 massively boosted the forces of this radicalism. The Muslim Brotherhood became a substantial movement. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan saw jihadism rise. In time other groups have sprung up: Boko Haram, al-Shabab, al-Qaeda, ISIS and many others. Some are violent. Some not. Sometimes they fight each other. But at other times, as with Iran and al-Qaeda, they cooperate. But all subscribe to basic elements of the same ideology. Today, there is a vast process of destabilisation going on in the Sahel, the group of countries across the northern part of sub-Saharan Africa. This will be the next wave of extremism and immigration that will inevitably hit Europe. My Institute works in many African countries. Barely a president I know does not think this is a huge problem for them and for some it is becoming THE problem. Iran uses proxies like Hizbullah to undermine moderate Arab countries in the Middle East. Lebanon is teetering on the brink of collapse. Turkey has moved increasingly down the Islamist path in recent years. In the West, we have sections of our own Muslim communities radicalised. Even more moderate Muslim nations such as Indonesia and Malaysia have, over a period of decades, seen their politics become more Islamic in practice and discourse. Look no further than Pakistan’s prime minister congratulating the Taliban on their “victory” to see that although, of course, many of those espousing Islamism are opposed to violence, they share ideological characteristics with many of those who use it – and a world view that is constantly presenting Islam as under siege from the West. Islamism is a long-term structural challenge because it is an ideology utterly inconsistent with modern societies based on tolerance and secular government. Yet Western policymakers can't even agree to call it “Radical Islam”. We prefer to identify it as a set of disconnected challenges, each to be dealt with separately. If we did define it as a strategic challenge, and saw it in whole and not as parts, we would never have taken the decision to pull out of Afghanistan. We are in the wrong rhythm of thinking in relation to Radical Islam. With Revolutionary Communism, we recognised it as a threat of a strategic nature, which required us to confront it both ideologically and with security measures. It lasted more than 70 years. Throughout that time, we would never have dreamt of saying, “well, we have been at this for a long time, we should just give up.” We knew we had to have the will, the capacity and the staying power to see it through. There were different arenas of conflict and engagement, different dimensions, varying volumes of anxiety as the threat ebbed and flowed. But we understood it was a real menace and we combined across nations and parties to deal with it. This is what we need to decide now with Radical Islam. Is it a strategic threat? If so, how do those opposed to it including within Islam, combine to defeat it? We have learnt the perils of intervention in the way we intervened in Afghanistan, Iraq and indeed Libya. But non-intervention is also policy with consequence. What is absurd is to believe the choice is between what we did in the first decade after 9/11 and the retreat we are witnessing now: to treat our full-scale military intervention of November 2001 as of the same nature as the secure and support mission in Afghanistan of recent times. Intervention can take many forms. We need to do it learning the proper lessons of the past 20 years according not to our short-term politics, but our long-term strategic interests. But intervention requires commitment. Not time limited by political timetables but by obedience to goals. For Britain and the US, these questions are acute. The absence of across-the-aisle consensus and collaboration and the deep politicisation of foreign policy and security issues is visibly atrophying US power. And for Britain, out of Europe and suffering the end of the Afghanistan mission by our greatest ally with little or no consultation, we have serious reflection to do. We don’t see it yet. But we are at risk of relegation to the second division of global powers. Maybe we don’t mind. But we should at least take the decision deliberatively. There are of course many other important issues in geopolitics: Covid-19, climate, the rise of China, poverty, disease and development. But sometimes an issue comes to mean something not only in its own right but as a metaphor, as a clue to the state of things and the state of peoples. If the West wants to shape the 21st century, it will take commitment. Through thick and thin. When it’s rough as well as easy. Making sure allies have confidence and opponents caution. Accumulating a reputation for constancy and respect for the plan we have and the skill in its implementation. It will require parts of the right in politics to understand that isolation in an interconnected world is self-defeating, and parts of the left to accept that intervention can sometimes be necessary to uphold our values. It requires us to learn lessons from the 20 years since 9/11 in a spirit of humility – and the respectful exchange of different points of view – but also with a sense of rediscovery that we in the West represent values and interests worth being proud of and defending. And that commitment to those values and interests needs to define our politics and not our politics define our commitment. This is the large strategic question posed by these last days of chaos in Afghanistan. And on the answer will depend the world’s view of us and our view of ourselves.
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It’s debatable, the figures were about 80,000 taliban vs around 130,000 ish army the 300k number is armed forces including airforce and ground staff plus police. also the taliban with local militia support probably numbered around 200,000. also there figures for the army actually are suspect and presumed to have a significant number of ‘ghost soldiers’ registered so at a local level the taliban probably did outnumber the ANA outdated report from the 13th but it outlines some of the difficulties Afghanistan: How the Taliban gained ground so quickly By Jonathan Beale Defence correspondent, BBC News Published 13 August Share Related Topics War in Afghanistan (2001-present) IMAGE SOURCEEPA image captionEstimates suggest the Taliban has a core strength of 60,000 fighters The speed of the Taliban advance in Afghanistan appears to have taken many by surprise - regional capitals seem to be falling like dominoes. The momentum is clearly with the insurgents, while the Afghan government struggles to keep its grip on power. This week, one leaked US intelligence report estimated that Kabul could come under attack within weeks, and the government could collapse within 90 days. So how did it unravel so quickly? The US and its Nato allies - including the UK - have spent the best part of the last 20 years training and equipping the Afghan security forces. Countless American and British generals have claimed to have created a more powerful and capable Afghan army. Promises that today appear pretty empty. EXPLAINER: Why is there a war in Afghanistan? FEATURE: The displaced people hoping for safety ON THE GROUND: Taliban back brutal rule as they strike for power PROFILE: Who are the Taliban? Strength of the Taliban The Afghan government should, in theory, still hold the upper hand with a larger force at its disposal. The Afghan security forces number more than 300,000, on paper at least. That includes the Afghan army, Air Force and police. IMAGE SOURCEEPA image captionThe Afghan army has a troubled history of high casualties, desertions and corruption But in reality the country has always struggled to meet its recruitment targets. The Afghan army and police has a troubled history of high casualties, desertions and corruption - with some unscrupulous commanders claiming the salaries of troops who simply didn't exist - so called "ghost soldiers". In its latest report to the US Congress, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan (SIGAR) expressed "serious concerns about the corrosive effects of corruption... and the questionable accuracy of data on the actual strength of the force". Jack Watling, of the Royal United Services Institute, says even the Afghan army has never been sure of how many troops it actually has. Added to that, he says there have been problems with maintaining equipment and morale. Soldiers are often sent to areas where they have no tribal or family connections. One reason why some may have been so quick to abandon their posts without putting up a fight. media captionThe BBC speaks to two high profile figures in the Taliban chain of command who have very different messages The Taliban's strength is even harder to measure. According to the US Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, estimates suggest a core strength of 60,000 fighters. With the addition of other militia groups and supporters, that number could exceed 200,000. But Dr Mike Martin, a Pashto-speaking former British army officer who tracked the history of the conflict in Helmand in his book An Intimate War, warns of the dangers of defining the Taliban as a single monolithic group. Instead he says "the Taliban is closer to a coalition of independent franchise holders loosely - and most probably temporarily - affiliated with one another". He notes the Afghan government, too, is as riven by local factional motivations. Afghanistan's shape changing history illustrates how families, tribes and even government officials have switched sides - often to ensure their own survival. Access to weapons Again, the Afghan government should have the advantage in terms of both funding and weapons. It has received billions of dollars to pay for soldiers' salaries and equipment - mostly by the US. In its July 2021 report, SIGAR said more than $88bn (£64bn) had been spent on Afghanistan's security. But it ominously added: "The question of whether that money was well spent will ultimately be answered by the outcome of the fighting on the ground." Afghanistan's Air Force should provide it with a critical edge on the battlefield. But it has consistently struggled to maintain and crew its 211 aircraft (a problem that's becoming more acute with the Taliban deliberately targeting pilots). Nor is it able to meet the demands from commanders on the ground. Hence the involvement recently of the US Air Force over cities like Lashkar Gah, which have come under Taliban attack. It's still not clear for how much longer the US is willing to provide that support. IMAGE SOURCEREUTERS image captionThousands of people are living in makeshift camps in Kabul after fleeing the Taliban offensive The Taliban have often relied on revenue from the drugs trade, but they have also had support from outside - most notably Pakistan. More recently the Taliban have seized weapons and equipment from the Afghan security forces - some of it provided by the US - including Humvees, night sights, machine guns, mortars and artillery. IMAGE SOURCEBBC SPORT Afghanistan was already awash with weapons after the Soviet invasion, and the Taliban have shown that even the crudest can defeat a much more sophisticated force. Think of the deadly effect of the Improvised Explosive Device (IED) on US and British forces. That and local knowledge and an understanding of the terrain have been their advantage. Focus on the north and west Despite the disparate nature of the Taliban, some still see evidence of a co-ordinated plan in their recent advance. Ben Barry, a former British army brigadier and now a senior fellow at the Institute of Strategic Studies, acknowledges the Taliban gains may be opportunistic, but adds: "If you were to write a campaign plan I would be hard pressed to come up with something better than this." He points to the focus of the Taliban attacks in the north and west, not their traditional southern strongholds, with successive regional capitals falling into their hands. The Taliban have also captured key border crossings and checkpoints, funnelling off much needed customs revenue away from the cash-strapped government. They've also stepped up targeted killings of key officials, human rights activists, and journalists. Slowly but surely wiping out some of the small gains made over the last 20 years. As for the Afghan government's strategy - that's proving harder to define. Promises of taking back all the territory captured by the Taliban sound increasingly hollow. Mr Barry says there appears to be a plan to keep hold of the larger cities. Afghan commandos have already been deployed to prevent Lashkar Gah in Helmand from falling. But for how much longer? Afghan special forces are relatively small in number, around 10,000 strong, and they're already stretched. The Taliban also appear to be winning the propaganda war and the battle of the narrative. Mr Barry says their momentum on the battlefield has boosted morale and given them a sense of unity. In contrast, the Afghan government has been on the backfoot, bickering and sacking generals. What is the end game? The situation certainly looks bleak for the Afghan government. But Jack Watling of RUSI says that while it looks increasingly pessimistic for the Afghan military, "the situation could still be saved by politics". If the government can win over tribal leaders, he says, there is still the chance of a stalemate. This is a view echoed by Mike Martin, who points to the return of former warlord Abdul Rashid Dostum to Mazar-i-Sharif as a significant moment. He's already cutting deals. The summer fighting season will soon be over as the Afghan winter sets in - making manoeuvre more difficult for forces on the ground. It is still possible that there'll be a stalemate by the end of the year, and the Afghan government will cling on to Kabul and a string of larger cities. The tide could even turn if the Taliban fracture. But at present it appears that the US and Nato's efforts to bring peace, security and stability to Afghanistan have been as futile as the Soviets before them.
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Afghanistan As US military sticks to airport, British and French forces are rescuing their citizens in Kabul: reports James R. Webb 14 hours ago 205 French Special Forces Soldiers stand guard near a military plane at airport in Kabul on August 17, 2021, as they arrive to evacuate French and Afghan nationals after the Taliban's stunning military takeover of Afghanistan. (Photo by STR / AFP) As the Defense Department continues to stick to its plans of not reaching out into Kabul to assist U.S. personnel and Afghan helpers evacuate, British and French forces have done so to rescue their citizens, multiple outlets report. The Daily Mail reported that London deployed an additional 300 troops to Kabul specifically to extract trapped British nationals earlier in the week. Within hours of touching down in Kabul, the British troops retrieved some 200 British nationals from around Kabul, the Telegraph reported. Prompting the mission were reports of Taliban hunting down former Afghan government officials, along with Britons stuck behind a web of Taliban checkpoints lining the route to the airport. Additionally, France 24 reports that the French military has been conducting similar operations since Monday. French President Emmanuel Macron thanked French security forces on Twitter for executing a ‘sensitive operation’ which evacuated more than 200 French and Afghans. News of these operations by NATO partners in Afghanistan leaves some Americans asking for Washington to follow suit. Matt Zeller, who served in Afghanistan as an Army intelligence officer, and is now a member of the Association of Wartime Allies, a group dedicated to relocating Afghans who helped the U.S., expressed his frustration on Facebook. “Some of our NATO allies have already figured out better solutions. Some, like the French, are just going out with their Special Forces and getting their people by whatever means necessary. Mr. President, if the French can do it, so can we,” Zeller wrote. Zeller’s frustrations stem from a chaotic scene around the HKIA that prevents potential evacuees from reaching safety. Earlier this week, Zeller told Military Times that the situation in Kabul was dire and shaping up to be “worse than Saigon.” “There’s total chaos at the airport, this is the absolute fiasco we all learned about, and nobody listened to,” Zeller told Military Times. “They need to then begin establishing secure corridors in Kabul, so people can get to the airport because what’s happened is the Taliban have erected checkpoints everywhere.” Sign up for the Early Bird Brief Get the military's most comprehensive news and information every morning (please select a country) United States United Kingdom Afghanistan Albania Algeria American Samoa Andorra Angola Anguilla Antarctica Antigua and Barbuda Argentina Armenia Aruba Australia Austria Azerbaijan Bahamas Bahrain Bangladesh Barbados Belarus Belgium Belize Benin Bermuda Bhutan Bolivia Bosnia and Herzegovina Botswana Bouvet Island Brazil British Indian Ocean Territory Brunei Darussalam Bulgaria Burkina Faso Burundi Cambodia Cameroon Canada Cape Verde Cayman Islands Central African Republic Chad Chile China Christmas Island Cocos (Keeling) Islands Colombia Comoros Congo Congo, The Democratic Republic of The Cook Islands Costa Rica Cote D'ivoire Croatia Cuba Cyprus Czech Republic Denmark Djibouti Dominica Dominican Republic Ecuador Egypt El Salvador Equatorial Guinea Eritrea Estonia Ethiopia Falkland Islands (Malvinas) Faroe Islands Fiji Finland France French Guiana French Polynesia French Southern Territories Gabon Gambia Georgia Germany Ghana Gibraltar Greece Greenland Grenada Guadeloupe Guam Guatemala Guinea Guinea-bissau Guyana Haiti Heard Island and Mcdonald Islands Holy See (Vatican City State) Honduras Hong Kong Hungary Iceland India Indonesia Iran, Islamic Republic of Iraq Ireland Israel Italy Jamaica Japan Jordan Kazakhstan Kenya Kiribati Korea, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Republic of Kuwait Kyrgyzstan Lao People's Democratic Republic Latvia Lebanon Lesotho Liberia Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Liechtenstein Lithuania Luxembourg Macao Macedonia, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Madagascar Malawi Malaysia Maldives Mali Malta Marshall Islands Martinique Mauritania Mauritius Mayotte Mexico Micronesia, Federated States of Moldova, Republic of Monaco Mongolia Montserrat Morocco Mozambique Myanmar Namibia Nauru Nepal Netherlands Netherlands Antilles New Caledonia New Zealand Nicaragua Niger Nigeria Niue Norfolk Island Northern Mariana Islands Norway Oman Pakistan Palau Palestinian Territory, Occupied Panama Papua New Guinea Paraguay Peru Philippines Pitcairn Poland Portugal Puerto Rico Qatar Reunion Romania Russian Federation Rwanda Saint Helena Saint Kitts and Nevis Saint Lucia Saint Pierre and Miquelon Saint Vincent and The Grenadines Samoa San Marino Sao Tome and Principe Saudi Arabia Senegal Serbia and Montenegro Seychelles Sierra Leone Singapore Slovakia Slovenia Solomon Islands Somalia South Africa South Georgia and The South Sandwich Islands Spain Sri Lanka Sudan Suriname Svalbard and Jan Mayen Swaziland Sweden Switzerland Syrian Arab Republic Taiwan, Province of China Tajikistan Tanzania, United Republic of Thailand Timor-leste Togo Tokelau Tonga Trinidad and Tobago Tunisia Turkey Turkmenistan Turks and Caicos Islands Tuvalu Uganda Ukraine United Arab Emirates United Kingdom United States United States Minor Outlying Islands Uruguay Uzbekistan Vanuatu Venezuela Viet Nam Virgin Islands, British Virgin Islands, U.S. Wallis and Futuna Western Sahara Yemen Zambia Zimbabwe Subscribe Yesterday, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said yesterday that despite the U.S. having at least 5,000 troops on the ground, he does not have the “capability” to reach out beyond HKIA. “The forces that we have are focused on the security of the airfield. And you know how important that is, and you know what happens if we — if we lose the ability to provide that security,” Austin told reporters from a podium in the Pentagon. Austin’s comments come amid reports of both British and French military units doing precisely that, pushing out into Kabul to secure the safety of their citizens. Occurring despite the Daily Mail reporting that the British contingent numbers less than 1,000 troops. In his press conference yesterday, Austin acknowledged the challenges that Taliban checkpoints present for those seeking to leave Afghanistan. However, Austin stated that the U.S. government would continue to negotiate safe passage of evacuees with the Taliban rather than take action. “We’ve gone back and tried to — and reinforce to the Taliban that if they have credentials, they need to be allowed through,” Austin said. Thursday morning, Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby and Army Maj. Gen. William D. “Hank” Taylor, deputy director for regional operations and force management for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reiterated that the U.S. military mission in Kabul is focused solely on operations at HKIA. Negotiating with the Taliban for safe passage is not enough for Zeller and others, particularly in light of actions taken by Britain and France. “It’s ungodly, man. F---ing sinful,” Dane Bowker, who deployed multiple times to Afghanistan, including with a Joint Special Operations Task Force, told Military Times. Zeller finished his message this morning by asking the president to take action, as the window to fly out both Americans and Afghans is rapidly closing. Among these actions was a request to use the U.S. troops on the ground to secure safe passage for those needing a flight out. “The Taliban cannot be allowed to remain 100m from US Marines where they can commit atrocities in front of us knowing we will do nothing. They are thugs. We are the United States of America. Show them we won’t be bullied. Use the might of our forces to create a humanitarian corridor in Kabul — so that people can safely get to the airport without this chaos and constant Taliban interference,” Zeller wrote.
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Afghanistan: Taliban 'tortured and massacred' men from Hazara minority Published 2 hours ago Share IMAGE SOURCEGETTY IMAGES image captionThe Hazara people traditionally live in the mountainous central belt of Afghanistan The Taliban recently "massacred" and brutally tortured several members of the Hazara minority in Afghanistan, says human rights group Amnesty International. Witnesses have given harrowing accounts of the killings, which took place in early July in Ghazni province. Since taking over the Afghan capital Kabul on Sunday, the Taliban have tried to portray a more restrained image. But Amnesty said the incident was a "horrifying indicator" of Taliban rule. The Hazara community is Afghanistan's third largest ethnic group. They mainly practise Shia Islam and have faced long-term discrimination and persecution in predominantly Sunni Afghanistan and Pakistan. 'Everything I ever thought I would have is gone' In the report published on Thursday, Amnesty said the nine Hazara men were killed between 4 and 6 July in Malistan district in the eastern Ghazni province. The rights group interviewed eyewitnesses and reviewed photographic evidence after the killings. Villagers said they had escaped to the mountains when fighting intensified between government forces and Taliban fighters. When some of them returned to the village of Mundarakht to collect food, they said the Taliban had looted their homes and were waiting for them. Separately, some men who passed through Mundarakht on their way home to their hamlet were also ambushed. In total six men were allegedly shot, some in the head, and three were tortured to death. According to witness accounts, one man was strangled with his own scarf and had his arm muscles sliced off. Another's body was shot to pieces. One eyewitness said they asked the fighters why they inflicted such brutality on their people. "When it is the time of conflict, everyone dies, it doesn't matter if you have guns or not. It is the time of war," a fighter allegedly said. Amnesty's Secretary-General Agnès Callamard said: "The cold-blooded brutality of these killings is a reminder of the Taliban's past record, and a horrifying indicator of what Taliban rule may bring." "These targeted killings are proof that ethnic and religious minorities remain at particular risk under Taliban rule in Afghanistan." It added that mobile phone services have been cut in many of the areas that have been captured by the Taliban, and so information about the killing had not leaked out until now. Amnesty called on the UN to investigate and protect those at risk. The Taliban were known for their brutal rule of Afghanistan which deprived women and ethnic minorities of their rights, before they were ousted by a US-led coalition in 2001. In a press conference following its takeover of Kabul, the militant group promised it would not launch revenge attacks on anyone who worked with US forces, and that it would also grant women rights under Islamic sharia law. But a UN document has warned that Taliban fighters have been going door-to-door to search for people who worked for Nato forces or the previous Afghan government. Who are the Hazara? Of Mongolian and Central Asian descent Legend has it they are descendants of Genghis Khan and his soldiers, who invaded Afghanistan in the 13th Century Mainly practise Shia Islam, in predominantly Sunni Afghanistan and Pakistan Make up 9% of Afghanistan's 39.9m people Severely persecuted by the Taliban in the past
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Anyone got any sources on the below? seen some Indian news outlets report it but I don’t know enough about them to know if I can trust them or not. looks like a core of the leadership of the ANA is at Kabul airport as well and wants to join. if true it would probably lend some credence to the claims of the army being ordered to stand down. but the Tajiks and Uzbeks do not get on well with the Taliban if this resistance is able to hold out it may become a bastion for those group to rally to. However then we are just back to 1996-2001 when the Taliban were in power but never controlled the country fully and was in a civil war