TheRussianRocket. Posted February 3, 2015 Share Posted February 3, 2015 In the right light, Mike Gillis is the greatest general manager in Vancouver Canucks history. In this ten-part story, Vancity Buzz breaks down the seminal moments of Gillis’ reign, offering pertinent insight into the defining moments of the franchise’s brightest period. We’ll take a look at it all: the good, the bad and the awkward. GAUGING MIKE GILLIS – PART 1: CHRISTIAN EHRHOFF In the right light, Mike Gillis is the greatest general manager in Vancouver Canucks history. In this ten-part story, Vancity Buzz breaks down the seminal moments of Gillis’ reign, offering pertinent insight into the defining moments of the franchise’s brightest period. We’ll take a look at it all: the good, the bad and the awkward. Under his six-year watch, the team captured five Northwest Division titles, two Presidents’ Trophies, and found themselves one win away from the franchise’s first Stanley Cup. Moreover, in 2011, Gillis was voted by his peers as the league’s best general manager. That’s not insignificant, when you consider Gillis’ tumultuous and bitter relationship with many of those voters. Gillis’ reign was accentuated by the signings of Daniel and Henrik Sedin, Ryan Kesler, Roberto Luongo, Dan Hamhuis, Kevin Bieksa, Alex Edler and Alex Burrows to below-market-value deals; a fundamental element of a winning (and desired) culture. But that, of course, is only half the story. Gillis’ critics point to an inherited core. They point to a three year goalie controversy, bungled beyond any comparable in the NHL’s modern era. They point to an unbridled arrogance with local media and longtime supporters. They point to crippling no-trade clauses, the dismissal of the winningest coach in team history and the disastrous hiring of John Tortorella. They also point to an (almost) unfathomable collapse and dismantled season ticket base. Seven months later, the debate continues to wage. Was Gillis the progressive pariah, or the unappreciative beneficiary of his predecessors’ foundation? Up first is one of the most important trades that Mike Gillis made as Canucks general manager. Part 1: Christian Ehrhoff Regardless of where you stand on the Gillis debate, a number of moves in his polarizing tenure were universally accepted as unqualified strokes of genius. At the top of that list, right beside the 5 year/$30.5M contracts of Daniel and Henrik Sedin, is the August 2009 acquisition of Christian Ehrhoff from the San Jose Sharks for bust prospects Patrick White and Daniel Rahimi. Embodying the puck-moving quarterback the Canucks had long since coveted, Ehrhoff quickly stabilized the back-end as the team established itself as the league’s defensive blueprint. In each of his two seasons in Vancouver, Ehrhoff captured the Babe Pratt Trophy as the team’s best defenseman. In 2009-10, he notched 44 points and contributed to the league’s fifth-best power play. He also set the franchise’s single-season plus-minus record at +36 (a fact often ignored by his critics). In 2010-11, he notched 50 points, and quarterbacked the league’s best power play. He excelled in the early rounds of the post-season, before succumbing to an injured shoulder. Simply put, the Canucks’ rapid ascent to the league’s forefront would not have been possible without the offensive stalwart. When you consider the related improvement of defensive partner Alex Edler, the cost of two forgettable non-NHL prospects, and a meager cap hit of $3.1M, Mike Gillis seemingly deserves an A+ for the transaction. But, like so many issues with Gillis, there’s another side to the story. Ehrhoff’s acquisition was never a hockey trade. Mike Gillis did not employ advanced analytics or deep hockey sense to reveal Ehrhoff’s massive upside. His player development team did not astutely recognize the inevitable demise of Daniel Rahimi and Patrick White’s NHL careers in the midst of a hot market. Instead, the move was entirely based on a San Jose team in financial purgatory. In preparations to obtain Dany Heatley, the team needed to dump salary and cap, without obtaining NHL (or potential NHL) salary and cap in return. But the Sharks weren’t interested in giving away a stud 27-year-old blueliner coming off a 42 point season. Rather, Ehrhoff’s inclusion was the sweetener for (and predicated upon) the acquisition of Brad Lukowich – an AHL-destined veteran with a $1.8M salary. Thus, if you don’t take Lukowich’s dead salary, you don’t get Ehrhoff. While New York (Wade Redden), Chicago (Cristobal Huet), Ottawa (Jonathan Cheechoo), Toronto (Jeff Finger), San Jose (Kyle McLaren) and New Jersey (Dan McGillis) have buried unfavorable contracts for salary cap relief, very few owners were willing to embrace others’ mistakes and write cheques with no on-ice benefit. As a result, the market for Ehrhoff was unusually dry. Enter Francesco Aquilini. In completing the transaction, ownership unequivocally demonstrated its commitment to winning at all costs. The move was never evaluative, but purely financial. If we eat $1.8M on Lukowich, we get the player we want. Without that financial investment, the transaction would never have materialized (an approach re-affirmed in 2011 with the acquisition of Steven Reiprecht in the David Booth deal). Thus, the credit never really belonged to Gillis. It belonged to Francesco Aquilini. But the story doesn’t end there. Gillis’ refusal to extend Ehrhoff in June 2011 may have been one of his biggest oversights. Believing his open-market value to be $5M/season (and preoccupied with an internal cap of $4.6M/season), the Canucks tabled Ehrhoff a 5 year/$23M offer, identical to the one signed by Kevin Bieksa. After declining the deal, Ehrhoff was quickly shipped to New York for a 4th round pick, surprising the blueliner who thought progress was being made. In justifying Ehrhoff’s departure, Gillis told local media, “I think Keith Ballard is going to be a good player for us next year”. In the end, Gillis pulled the trigger and thus deserves some credit for Ehrhoff’s acquisition. In many ways, he was the most effective blueliner the team has ever had. But that trigger was solely pulled because of ownership’s willingness to eat dead money to facilitate the deal. It’s a luxury 20+ other general managers weren’t afforded. Gillis was. That can’t be ignored. When you also consider the Canucks’ franchise-long pursuit of a puck moving, powerplay quarterback, Gillis’ willingness to allow Ehrhoff to walk (based on a reported difference of ~$400,000/season) is somewhat perplexing. That uncertainty was magnified by the signing of Jason Garrison (an inconsistent, unproven defenseman) to a 6 year/$27.6M deal in July 2012, largely to fill the void left by Ehrhoff. Never able to plug the gap, Garrison would become a prime buy-out candidate, before being shipped to Tampa Bay for a 2nd round pick in June 2014. Maybe Ehrhoff wasn’t a shining star on Gillis’ resume, after all. GAUGING MIKE GILLIS – PART 2: THE SUNDIN SIGNING In this ten-part story, Vancity Buzz breaks down the seminal moments of Gillis’ reign, offering pertinent insight into the defining moments of the franchise’s brightest period. We’ll take a look at it all: the good, the bad and the awkward. Canucks fans didn’t know what to expect when the Canucks hired Mike Gillis as a rookie GM in the summer of 2008. After he proclaimed, “I don’t think this team is close [to contending] at this particular point,” at his introductory press conference, fans felt more nervousness than optimism due to his brash confidence. Clearly Gillis was going to be honest in his assessment and aggressive with his moves. Character and integrity – these were the key attributes for any player who was going to play for his revamped team. He repeated the words every chance he got in those first few years. Gillis also emphasized he was going to make Vancouver a highly desired home for all NHL players. “I’m hoping to be able to attract players here because, in dealing with them for the last 17 years, I understand the message they want to hear and what is important to them, ” he said. “We have a solid defence and solid goaltending. But there are a number of areas that need to be addressed.” Looking at that list, the glaring omission was the forwards. Before throwing the famous two-year $20 million offer at Mats Sundin during the summer of 2008, Gillis jettisoned Markus Naslund and Brendan Morrison and shored up his forward depth with Ryan Johnson, Kyle Wellwood, Steve Bernier and Darcy Hordichuk. He also signed Pavol Demitra to a two-year $8 million deal. Making sense of the $20M offer Sundin was coming off a 78 point season with the Maple Leafs and he had put up 1,321 points in his 1,305 game NHL career so far. The offer was meant to be a signal to fans of the team and to the rest of the NHL that Francesco Aquilini’s Canucks, with Gillis at the helm, were not to be taken lightly. As the Sundin saga played out over the first few months of the 2008 season, there were a number of teams in the sweepstakes. Throughout it, Gillis displayed an extreme amount of patience and faith in the player he was chasing. On December 5, TSN reported five teams were still in the running – the New York Rangers, Philadelphia Flyers, Chicago Blackhawks, Montreal Canadiens and the Canucks. Still, Gillis maintained his patience. “I’ve represented players who have been in similar situations and I understand and appreciate it.” (from TSN.ca) When Sundin made the decision Canucks fans had been hanging on for 5 months, there was a strange feeling of excited disbelief in the air. Could Gillis’ vision for a program of excellence – one that attracted the league’s best talent – become a reality? Sundin had chosen Vancouver over teams that were stronger Cup contenders – places that were historically more alluring NHL destinations. “I think we’ll see a big, strong centre-ice man who skates really well and averages a point a game,” Gillis said of Sundin. “He has been the captain of a team in a [Toronto] market that is really challenging and he has handled it impeccably.” “I think the quality we try and get from every player, in terms of character and integrity, are absolutely there.” Sundin began his time as a Canuck slowly once he finally began playing in 2009, but by February he was making waves around the league. “Sundin finding groove with Demitra, Kesler – Canucks’ new 2nd line arrives in St. Louis with 15 points in 2 games” – this was the headline of an article on CBC.ca article published Feb. 10, 2009, following a 7-3 win over the Blackhawks. That pace didn’t last – by the end of it Sundin managed 28 points in 41 regular season games with the Canucks. In the playoffs, he did better putting up 8 points through 8 playoff games. While the point totals weren’t up to the standards he set in Toronto, Sundin brought some intangibles to Gillis’ freshman year. Sundin’s legacy The year after Sundin left, Henrik and Daniel Sedin’s scoring output took a massive jump. Henrik won the Art Ross and Hart Trophies in 2010 (112 points) and Daniel followed up with his own Art Ross in 2011 (104 points). Asked about what changed for them by The Vancouver Sun‘s Iain MacIntyre, Daniel gave credit to Sundin: “We have a different attitude toward the game…” “Looking at Mats, he had a tough start. It didn’t bother him. He just came to the rink and did the same things over and over again. He knew it was going to pay off. He still kept his head high and by the playoffs he was awesome.” “We’ve always put a lot of pressure on ourselves. You learn to deal with that. But Mats put us over the top to see how he handled things.” Henrik agreed: “To see Mats out there, struggling, getting criticized, but still keeping his shifts short – he never played for himself. I think that’s been a key for us.” And on an appearance on CBC’s After Hours in 2010, Ryan Kesler credited Sundin with improving him as a pro, getting him to show up every single game and bringing his game to the next level. Kesler’s point total jumped from 59 to 75 that year. It’s hard to quantify what effect Sundin’s signing had on legitimizing Vancouver as a destination (did key players Mikael Samuelsson, Dan Hamhuis and Manny Malhotra sign with the Canucks the following summer because of the Mats Sundin effect?). Still, if Sundin had half the impact the Sedins and Kesler say he had on their careers, that $8.6M pro-rated contract has to be money well spent. The big Swede set an example of excellence that Canucks players marveled at and learned from. And perhaps more importantly, Sundin’s signing was proof to Canucks fans that Mike Gillis was dead serious about winning. GAUGING MIKE GILLIS – PART 3: MONEY SAVING CONTRACTS It’s wrong that Mike Gillis gets ridiculed in this city.I know that’s not a popular view, but it angers me that the most successful general manager in Vancouver Canucks history would get booed mercilessly if he showed his face at Rogers Arena. In this ten-part story, Vancity Buzz breaks down the seminal moments of Gillis’ reign, offering pertinent insight into the defining moments of the franchise’s brightest period. We’ll take a look at it all: the good, the bad and the awkward. In six seasons under Mike Gillis, the Canucks won their division four times, won two Presidents’ Trophies and came within a whisker of winning the first Stanley Cup in franchise history. Did he build the team from scratch? Of course not, nobody does, but he played a large part in the rise and the fall of the Vancouver Canucks. Today, I would like to focus on the rise. The Canucks had the best team in the NHL in 2010-11, plain and simple. They proved it by being the clear class of the regular season, winning the Presidents’ Trophy by a whopping 10 points. They had six more regulation/overtime wins than any other team. They had the best power play and the third best penalty killing. They scored the most goals and gave up the fewest. This was not a run-of-the-mill regular season. And contrary to popular belief, they didn’t do it by simply beating up on the other four members of the Northwest Division. Certainly playing in a weak division helped, but only moderately. They played the Edmonton Oilers on six occasions. The San Jose Sharks played Edmonton four times. And the Canucks actually lost to them twice near the end of the regular season 4-1 and 2-0 after they had the Presidents Trophy clinched. Had they not run into a string of injuries and bad luck, they would have won the Stanley Cup too. Vancouver Canucks ✔ @VanCanucks Follow Lines at practice: Sedins-Burrows. Raymond-Kesler-Samuelsson. Torres-Malhotra-Hansen. Glass-Lapierre-Higgins. #NHL 1:00 PM - 9 Mar 2011 The 2010-11 team is lamented for not having an effective 4th line. After the trade deadline passed in 2011 (ie. the last chance Mike Gillis could tinker with his team), the Canucks had a 4th line that consisted of Max Lapierre, Chris Higgins and Tanner Glass. Not bad. So how did the Canucks go from being out of the playoffs in Dave Nonis’ final year to best team in the league? Good Great contracts. The Canucks were full of them in 2010-11 and the vast majority of them were signed by Michael D. Gillis. Here are the notable ones signed by Gillis that were in effect in 2010-11: Player Cap Hit Henrik Sedin $6.1 M Daniel Sedin $6.1 M Roberto Luongo $5.333 M Ryan Kesler $5 M Dan Hamhuis $4.5 M Alex Edler $3.25 M Mason Raymond $2.55 M Mikael Samuelsson $2.5 M Manny Malhotra $2.5 M Alex Burrows $2 M Raffi Torres $1 M Jannik Hansen $0.825 M Tanner Glass $0.625 M In the spring of 2011 these were all excellent contracts to have. Daniel and Henrik Sedin were two of the best offensive players in the league and their cap hits ranked #38 and 39 in the league. That was less than the likes of Jason Spezza, Paul Stastny and Ryan Smyth. In 2011, under the terms of the old collective bargaining agreement, Roberto Luongo’s contract did not suck. In fact, it was excellent. Luongo’s cap circumventing deal had a cap hit of just $5.333 M, which ranked him 9th among goalies (less than Tomas Vokoun and Cristobal Huet!). Before that contract was signed, Luongo had the 2nd highest cap hit among goalies and was one of the best netminders in the league. Luongo’s contract became unmovable after the unprecedented move by Gary Bettman to change the rules of cap circumventing contracts after the 2013-14 lockout. It was a move that no general manager could have predicted when the contract was signed. His crown jewel was the 4-year $2 M per season contract signed by Alex Burrows. Burrows, who was in the midst of a breakout 28 goal season when he signed the deal, was the best value-for-money in the NHL. Burrows scored 28, 35, 26 and 28 goals during those years. Katie Strang ✔ @KatieStrangESPN Follow According to one source, #Isles offered more money to Dan Hamhuis than what he ended up signing for as well.... 5:09 PM - 1 Jul 2010 In some cases, Gillis was able to get players to sign in Vancouver for less money than they were offered elsewhere. This was the case, in part, because the Canucks became destination franchise. That team also benefited from Sami Salo and Kevin Bieksa’s contracts, leftover from the Dave Nonis era, but otherwise it was essentially a team signed/re-signed/acquired by Mike Gillis. Critics of Gillis would say that he used his cap savings on bust players like Keith Ballard and David Booth, and they would be right. Gillis struggled in the trade department, but that didn’t fester much until after 2011. Until then, the Keith Ballard trade was really his only major misstep. In the contract signing department, Gillis was the best in the league. He did make some mistakes, but they were usually on short-term deals. Mats Sundin ($8.6 M pro-rated), who was an effective player in the playoffs in Vancouver, was signed for just half a season. Pavol Demitra ($4 M) was under contract for two seasons and put up 53 points in his first in Vancouver. Mathieu Schneider ($2.75 M) was a horrendous deal, but he was under contract for just one season and jettisoned quickly. Some of the shine wore off Gillis’ contract signing prowess after 2011, but he was still rather good. Jason Garrison’s 6-year contract worth $4.6 M draws a lot of ire, but it was at least still tradeable. Gillis never signed a debilitating contract like Colby Armstrong (3 years, $3 M), Mike Komisarek (5 years, $4.5 M) or David Clarkson (7 years, $5.25 M). He may have traded for one or two of them (David Booth and Keith Ballard), but when he was in the negotiating room, there was no one better. The Canucks went downhill after 2011, although that did include a second Presidents’ Trophy, I might add. And we are seeing this year that the team that Gillis left for Trevor Linden and company wasn’t as bad as some may have thought. The people lamenting Gillis for re-signing the Sedins ($7 M), Edler ($5 M), Burrows ($4.5 M), Higgins ($2.5 M) and Hansen ($2.5 M) aren’t as loud as they were six months ago. The late Pat Quinn is viewed as a hero in this city and for good reason. I have written about all the great things he did for the Vancouver Canucks. But when he was fired in 1997, the Canucks were a team that had missed the playoffs the previous year and were in disarray. The team did not have a legitimate starting goaltender and did not have a legitimate first line centre. He didn’t have a particularly great drafting record and he angered Pavel Bure enough to make him want to leave town. He let Cliff Ronning and Geoff Courtnall walk for nothing in free agency and he held onto players like Jyrki Lumme, Dana Murzyn and Dave Babych for too long. That’s obviously a cynical way to look at Pat Quinn’s tenure in Vancouver, but that’s also the way Mike Gillis is unfairly viewed. He was far from perfect but he did some good things and he helped produce some of the best hockey this city has ever seen. GAUGING MIKE GILLIS – PART 4: BALLARD AND BOOTH BLUNDERS They are perhaps the two most non-goalie defining moments of Mike Gillis’ tenure with the Vancouver Canucks. In this ten-part story, Vancity Buzz breaks down the seminal moments of Gillis’ reign, offering pertinent insight into the defining moments of the franchise’s brightest period. We’ll take a look at it all: the good, the bad and the awkward. The 2010 draft was the beginning of the most important offseason in Canucks history. The Canucks had just finished their second season under new GM Mike Gillis and were coming off a second straight second round defeat at the hands of the eventual Stanley Cup Champion Chicago Blackhawks. They had just won their second consecutive division title in a division that had no yet become the laughing stock of the NHL (that title belonged to the Southeast Division back then). Henrik Sedin had just won the first Hart Trophy in franchise history and his brother Daniel could have been a finalist too had he not missed 19 games due to injury. Ryan Kesler set a career high in points, with 75. Alex Burrows set a career high in goals, with 35. Roberto Luongo proved he could win the big game, helping Canada win gold at the 2010 Olympics. The Canucks were a team on the rise, with most of their top players in the prime of their careers. Meanwhile, the other Western Conference powers all seemed to take a step back. The window was officially open. Their playoff nemesis, the Blackhawks, were in salary cap hell, having to part with key players: Andrew Ladd, Dustin Byfuglien, Kris Versteeg, Troy Brouwer, Brian Campbell and Antti Niemi. Perennial powerhouse Detroit was aging and proving that they were not a super power anymore. San Jose looked good, but hey, they never win in the playoffs, right? Keith Ballard What Mike Gillis needed to do was bolster his defence. The Canucks’ blueline was good, but injury-prone. Willie Mitchell missed the final 34 games of the regular season and all of the playoffs with what was feared as a career threatening concussion. He would not be re-signed. Kevin Bieksa missed 27 games. And Sami Salo was, well, Sami Salo. The Canucks needed depth and they needed an impact d-man. Unfortunately Mike Gillis chose Keith Ballard. In an offseason where Gillis made so many great free agent signings (Hamhuis, Malhotra, Torres), the decision to trade for Keith Ballard at the 2010 draft may have cost them a Stanley Cup. Gillis traded Michael Grabner, Steve Bernier and a 1st round draft pick to Florida for Ballard and Victor Oreskovich. It was the right trade, for the wrong player. Grabner was young and had shown some flashes, but would need to clear waivers in order to be sent to the AHL. He was not likely an everyday player on a Stanley Cup contender. If there was ever a time to mortgage a part of the future for the present, it was in the summer of 2010. Ballard was a high-risk, high-reward player. That meant that he would never get much of a chance with head coach Alain Vigneault. On the Canucks, Ballard was a 5th or 6th defenceman and Vigneault wanted a player in that role to be low risk. What the Canucks needed was a good, dependable stay-at-home defenceman. Say, like Willie Mitchell. When the Canucks’ depth was ultimately tested in the Stanley Cup Final, Ballard was used just once. He was unable to replace Dan Hamhuis, or even Aaron Rome, for that matter. Ballard was paired with Kevin Bieksa in game 4 in Boston, and failed miserably. Some of that falls on Vigneault, who wasn’t able to work him into the lineup all year, and some of that falls on Gillis for acquiring the wrong player. David Booth Coming off a crushing game 7 loss in the Stanley Cup Final, the Canucks were still an elite team in 2011-12. Christian Ehrhoff and Raffi Torres were gone, but the rest of the team was retained. Popular belief was that the Canucks needed a goal scoring winger and more size/toughness. On October 22, 2011 Mike Gillis pulled the trigger on a deal that was supposed to help with all of those things. The Canucks sent Mikael Samuelsson and Marco Sturm to the Florida Panthers in exchange for David Booth, Steve Reinprecht and a 3rd round pick in 2013 (Cole Cassels). Samuelsson, who was on expiring contract, proved he had some gas left in the tank. With the Panthers, he notched 28 points in 48 games during the regular season and 5 points in 7 playoff games. Marco Sturm was on expiring contract too, but was running on empty. Booth was supposed to be the power forward the Canucks needed. Coming off a 23-goal season and just three years removed from a 31-goal season, Booth was expected to form a strong duo with second line centre Ryan Kesler. Just like with Keith Ballard, it was the right type of move, at the right time, for the wrong player. Booth was big and strong, but he never meshed well with Ryan Kesler. Kesler had a shoot-first mentality and needed a playmaker to play with. Booth, who regularly scored more goals than assists in his career, was a straight-forward shooter. The Canucks lost to the LA Kings in the first round that season, primarily because they couldn’t score goals. The David Booth trade wasn’t the only reason, but it was a contributing factor to that loss. The shifty Samuelsson was probably a better fit with Ryan Kesler and was certainly a better with the Sedins, who Booth ended up playing with in the playoffs. Keeping Mikael Samuelsson may not have been the answer, but at least he wouldn’t have hamstrung the organization with an unfriendly cap hit going forward. Poster Boys Keith Ballard and David Booth are the poster boys for regrettable trades with the Florida Panthers. They were both brought in at key times during the Stanley Cup window of Gillis’ Canucks. While Mike Gillis seemed to strike all of the right notes with regards to free agency and re-signing core players, he failed to trade for the right piece to put the team over the top. A lot of the money that Gillis saved with the great contracts he signed was wasted away with $4.2M Ballard (a depth defenceman) and $4.25M Booth (a third line winger). Not only did both players prove to be terrible fits with the team, they were both eventually bought out of their long term contracts. GAUGING MIKE GILLIS – PART 5: THE LUONGO CONTRACT When Canuck fans look back at Roberto Luongo’s eight-year tenure in Vancouver, several things should come to mind. Six Northwest Division titles. Two Presidents’ Trophies. Two Vezina nominations. One Hart Trophy nomination. One Lester B. Pearson nomination. One Jennings Trophy. Two team MVPs. Game 7 of the Stanley Cup Finals. A record of 275-140-50. Yet, perhaps more than anything, fans will remember an unrestrained, headline-grabbing quote from April 2, 2013. “My contract sucks.” In the immediate context, many agreed with Luongo. After all, his back-diving deal had just killed a much-desired, mutually beneficial trade to Toronto. As a result, Luongo would stay front-and-centre of a two-year goalie controversy that captivated Vancouver’s media market unlike any sports story in the city’s history. The problem was, Luongo’s assessment was dead wrong. In reality, the deal represented one of Mike Gillis’ finest moves as Canucks’ GM. In this ten-part story, Vancity Buzz breaks down the seminal moments of Gillis’ reign, offering pertinent insight into the defining moments of the franchise’s brightest period. We’ll take a look at it all: the good, the bad and the awkward. The Background When Mike Gillis took the organizational reins in April 2008, he left no uncertainty that an extension for Luongo, the team’s backbone, would be an immediate focus. “Roberto is clearly a priority. I feel he’s the best goaltender in hockey…he has to be a priority…we need to ensure that the asset is utilized as quickly and efficiently as possible.” Gillis knew that establishing and maintaining a championship window necessitated retaining Luongo’s services beyond his 4 year/$27M deal. He was right, too. In his two seasons in Vancouver, Luongo had established himself as (arguably) the league’s finest goaltender. In 2006-2007, Luongo played 76 games, posted a 2.29 GAA and .921 SV%, and earned Hart, Vezina and Lester B. Pearson nominations. It was an unparalleled season that resulted in the greatest hockey meme in Canucks history. A year later, Luongo played 73 games, posted a 2.38 GAA and .917 SV%, and earned his second straight team MVP award. Simply put, the Canucks had their goalie. They just needed to keep him. The Logic On September 2, 2009, Gillis finalized a 12 year/$64M deal with Luongo, keeping the 30-year-old goaltender in Vancouver through 2021-2022. In doing so, Gillis established Vancouver as a destination where elite players wanted to play, win, and finish their careers. For Luongo, the deal made perfect sense. Kicking in at age thirty-one, Luongo would derive $57M in the first eight years of the deal (taking $10M in year one). In other words, through creative accounting, Luongo would be compensated as the league’s highest paid goaltender. For Gillis and the Canucks, the deal was equally enticing. With no clear NHL goalie in the team’s system (23-year-old Cory Schneider had played just eight NHL games, posting a 2-6 record with an .877 SV% and 3.38 GAA), Luongo’s contract stabilized the back-end for the foreseeable future. It also dropped Luongo’s cap hit from $6.75M to $5.3M, affording additional flexibility for other extensions and signings (including, but not limited to, Ryan Kesler, Dan Hamhuis and Raffi Torres). And best of all, the contract had no downside. Based on the NHL’s collective bargaining agreement, if Luongo retired before 2021-2022, the deal would effectively vanish. With no reasonable expectation that Luongo would play until age 42 (and structured payments dropping to $3.38M in 2018, $1.6M in 2019, and $1M in 2020 and 2021), Gillis had locked up an elite goaltender, for the duration of his career, at a $5.3M cap hit. In that sense, it was a series of one year deals with a player option. The Contract In the first year of the contract (2010-2011), Luongo would start 60 games, turn in a 2.11 GAA and .928 SV% while earning a Vezina nomination and William M. Jennings Trophy. This success would coincide with the Canucks’ first Presidents’ Trophy and a trip to Game 7 of the Stanley Cup Finals. Despite his $10M salary, Luongo’s $5.3M cap hit would place him 9th among NHL goaltenders. The following season (2011-2012), Luongo would start 54 games, turn in a 2.41 GAA and .919 SV%, and drive the Canucks towards a second Presidents’ Trophy. Despite earning $6.7M in salary, Luongo’s cap hit would rank 8th amongst NHL goaltenders. In 2012-2013, amidst an ongoing media circus and demotion to Cory Schneider’s back-up, Luongo would play 20 of 48 games, posting a 9-6-3 record with a .907 SV% and a 2.56 GAA. While Luongo’s numbers faltered, the results were not disproportionate to his cap hit (ranked 9th amongst NHL goaltenders). In 2013-2014, plagued by yet another media circus, Luongo would play 42 games, posting a 2.38 GAA and .917 SV% (numbers reflecting a top-10 goaltender) before being jettisoned to Florida in the tumultuous aftermath of the Heritage Classic. His cap hit would rank 12th amongst NHL goaltenders. This season, amongst goaltenders playing at least 25 games, Luongo’s 2.28 GAA ranks 7th, while his .926 SV% ranks 3rd. His cap hit sits at 13th. Maybe Gillis was on to something, after all. Additional Considerations Ultimately, we can only evaluate Gillis’ decisions based on the legislation of the time. As such, it’s unrealistic to fault Gillis for the retroactive sanctions applied to Luongo’s deal in the 2013 collective bargaining agreement. The reality remains that Gillis locked-in an elite goaltender, at a mid-range cap hit, for the duration of his career. As the salary cap has increased, the impact of Luongo’s cap hit has waned (moving from 9th in 2011, to 13th in 2014, to 15th in 2015). This trend is not by accident. It’s Gillis’ handiwork. It’s also imperative to dispel the notion that Cory Schneider’s ascent made Luongo’s contract a “bad deal”. Simply put, if you removed Cory Schneider from the equation, you still had a top-end goaltender with a manageable cap hit. When you added Cory Schneider to that equation, you had a problem of riches. Sadly, Vancouver’s fanbase could never comprehend that logic. Instead, they “supported” Schneider by berating Luongo and his contract. They’re on-pace to repeat this ordeal with Ryan Miller and Eddie Lack. Finally, it’s crucial to recognize the deal’s intention to marry Luongo and the Canucks. The terms and related no-movement-clause reflected the parties’ wishes that Luongo would end his career in Vancouver, effectively making the contract immovable. In short, it was strategically designed to be a Canuck-friendly (rather than a generic team-friendly) contract. When plans changed, the parties were largely victims of their own drafting. Conclusion In the end, Mike Gillis’ legacy in Vancouver will likely be plagued by spotty trades, poor drafting, countless no-trade-clauses and an inability to control an alleged “goalie controversy”. But for everything he got wrong, Gillis’ logic, analysis and execution with the Luongo deal were absolutely right. It laid the foundation for the team’s ascent to the NHL forefront, afforded invaluable cap flexibility, yielded immediate results, and (almost five years later) continues to hold value (despite its potential implications) with a top-end goaltender at a below-market cap hit. Funny enough, we could use a deal like that in Vancouver. GAUGING MIKE GILLIS – PART 6: TRADING CODY HODGSON Mike Gillis surprised everyone on February 27, 2012. That was the day of the trade deadline. That was the day that he traded his first draft pick, the golden boy, Cody Hodgson. Few draft picks in Canucks history carried as much hype as Cody Hodgson. He was the 10th pick overall in the 2008 draft, Mike Gillis’ first with Vancouver. Many fans and media were clamoring for the Canucks to take power forward and BC boy, Kyle Beach, with the pick. The Canucks scouting staff wanted Beach too, who Gillis smartly passed on. Beach was picked one pick later, by the Chicago Blackhawks. He is currently playing in Austria and has yet to play an NHL game. Bullet dodged. Here is how Gillis explained the choice back in 2008: GM Mike Gillis said Hodgson is a natural leader who impressed the Canucks’ sport psychologist. “His ability, leadership and character were all over the top as far as I was concerned,” Gillis said. “[The psychologist] had him ranked at the very top in terms of leadership, integrity and character.” And here’s what other scouts around the league were talking about him: Scouts at the draft said Hodgson projects to be a second-line centre or winger in the NHL. Some scouts said Hodgson does compare favourably to Steve Stamkos, dubbing Hodgson “Stamkos light.” “Stamkos light”. In hindsight, this is hilarious. But we had reason to believe in Hodgson (and consequently, Gillis) in the years that followed that pick. After being drafted by Vancouver, Hodgson had a monster year. He was named the OHL Player of the Year, beating out John Tavares. He was arguably the best player on the gold medal winning Canadian team at the World Junior Championship and led the tournament in scoring. It was a question of when, not if, he would become an impact player in the NHL. In this ten-part story, Vancity Buzz breaks down the seminal moments of Gillis’ reign, offering pertinent insight into the defining moments of the franchise’s brightest period. We’ll take a look at it all: the good, the bad and the awkward. Back Injury Then came the summer of 2009. Hodgson injured his back while dryland training under the supervision of Canucks director of player development, Dave Gagner. Gagner was thought to be one of Gillis’ key hires to help improve the development of the team’s prospects. To make matters worse, the injury was then misdiagnosed by the Canucks. Hodgson came to training camp but wasn’t close to earning a spot on the team. Hodgson admitted that he had a back injury and shooting pain down his leg. For whatever reason, Canucks management thought otherwise, as evidenced by this article from Matt Sekeres in February, 2010: Privately, the Canucks wondered if Hodgson was simply spooked by the talent at camp and used the back injury to explain his underwhelming performance. After being cut by the Canucks in training camp, Hodgson was unable to play hockey for four months. Hodgson refused to train with Dave Gagner the following summer, instead choosing his own guy, Gary Roberts. There was a rift between Mike Gillis and Cody Hodgson. Turning Pro The 2010-11 season went a lot more normally for Hodgson. He started the season with the Manitoba Moose of the AHL, scoring 30 points in 52 games. When Manny Malhotra suffered a career threatening eye injury, it opened up a spot for Hodgson with the Canucks and Coho got the call-up. Playing for a contender, Hodgson saw limited ice time on the Canucks fourth line. Hodgson’s coming out party was the 2011-12 season. With Manny Malhotra clearly not right in the season following his eye injury, there was a spot open at third line centre and Hodgson jumped on it. Hodgson had 16 goals and 17 assists in 63 games. He also anchored the Canucks’ impressive second power play unit. Among Canucks forwards, Hodgson ranked 9th in even strength ice time and 6th in power play ice time. Those are numbers befit of a young player trying to prove himself in his first full NHL season on a contender. The Canucks were a good team and Hodgson was performing well. But behind the scenes, things were not well. With Henrik Sedin and Ryan Kesler in front of him on the depth chart at centre, opportunities for Hodgson were limited and wasn’t terribly happy about it. The Trade On February 27, 2012 Mike Gillis shocked the hockey world. He traded the 22-year-old Hodgson to the Buffalo Sabres for 21-year-old Zack Kassian (Alex Sulzer and Marc-Andre Gragnani were also involved in the deal). Shane M @SocialAssassin2 Follow I also wonder if other teams were made aware that Hodgson was available. I find it hard to believe there wasn't a better return than Kassian 6:33 PM - 27 Feb 2012 omarcanuck @omarcanuck Follow Will Kassian score big goals like Hodgson has come to do? It was nice having that skill on the third line... #Canucks 12:59 PM - 27 Feb 2012 Pass it to Bulis @passittobulis Follow Thing to look forward to: after trading away Grabner and Hodgson, there will be no end to the MG bashing if Kassian doesn't pan out. 4:52 PM - 27 Feb 2012 Depending on who you believe, it appears that on some level Hodgson asked for a trade. Hodgson was labelled a complainer by Mike Gillis: “There clearly were issues that were ongoing,” Gillis said of Hodgson. “I spent more time on Cody’s issues than every other player combined on our team the last three years.” That’s not exactly the player that oozed of character and leadership they thought they were getting. Dan Murphy ✔ @sportsnetmurph Follow #canucks GM Mike Gillis says Hodgson/Kassian deal all about balance. Needed more size and toughness for playoff grind. 2:45 PM - 27 Feb 2012 In many ways, the trade was a franchise altering trade. It was an admission by Gillis that he needed to adjust to the way the game was being called. The NHL may not have formally made any rule changes, but they had clearly altered the way that games were being refereed. Gillis summized that Canucks were going to need to get bigger and better defensively. They traded for Sami Pahlsson the same day as the Hodgson trade to replace his spot in the lineup. The Fallout So who won the trade? In the short term it looked like a clear win for the Sabres. Hodgson was a legitimate second line scoring centre. He scored 34 points in the lockout shortened 48-game season. Playing for the tire fire that was the Buffalo Sabres last year, Hodgson scored 20 goals. Meanwhile, Zack Kassian has asserted himself as a physical third line winger. He had 11 points in the lockout shortened season. Last year, he scored 14 goals. With Cody Hodgson in the midst of a dreadful season this year with the Sabres, one can make an argument that the Canucks actually won the trade. Hodgson has clearly fallen out of favour with head coach Ted Nolan and has seen time in the press box and on the fourth line. Hodgson’s critics will point to his poor defensive play and perceived bad attitude. Kassian’s critics will point to his equally poor defensive play and perceived lack of maturity. When the dust settles 10 years from now, I believe history will show that Cody Hodgson had a better career than Zack Kassian, but that’s very much an arguable point. It Doesn’t Matter In so many ways, it doesn’t matter if the Canucks win or lose this trade in the long term. What mattered most at the 2012 trade deadline was the 2012 Stanley Cup and the Hodgson trade put them further away from that goal. Hodgson was fifth in scoring among Canucks forwards at the time of the trade. Kassian was a young player who was unlikely to help the team in the short-term. Kassian was still very raw in his development and was a fourth line player. Hodgson’s replacement, Pahlsson, was in the twilight of his career and played his final NHL game that season. The Canucks had trouble scoring down the stretch and could have used Hodgson, particularly on their fledgling power play. The Canucks went 0-14 on the power play in their first three losses to the Kings in their first round playoff series. Vancouver scored just 8 goals of any kind in 5 playoff games. The team couldn’t have anticipated Daniel Sedin’s concussion, which caused him to miss three playoff games; but they certainly could have anticipated a drop in production from Ryan Kesler, who was playing with an injury at the time of the trade. What Could Have Been Perhaps the Canucks were doomed to fail regardless, given the fact they were about to be ambushed by perhaps the best 8th place team in NHL history. But if Vancouver could have beaten the Kings, the path to the Stanley Cup was relatively easy (if the path to the Stanley Cup can ever be considered “easy”). Mike Greveling @Golfing_Guy71 Follow @botchford Kings are rolling over St Louis much like they did the Canucks. Not feeling quite as shocked & pissed off as I was.#nhl.#playoffs 6:55 PM - 30 Apr 2012 The Canucks would have played Nashville in the second round and either Phoenix or St Louis in the third round. Certainly those are all strong defensive teams, but not unbeatable powerhouses. The Stanley Cup finalist was an underwhelming New Jersey Devils. If the Canucks felt that the Hodgson-Kassian deal was good for the future of the team, then the trade could have been made in the offseason. If Hodgson had to be moved immediately, then he should have been moved for more immediate help. Would Cody Hodgson have peaked the interest of the Columbus Blue Jackets, who traded 27-year-old Jeff Carter for Jack Johnson and a 1st round draft pick four days earlier? Perhaps not, but that’s the type of deal the Canucks should have been in the market for. Instead, Mike Gillis traded for a future asset. An asset that wouldn’t significantly help the team until after their championship window had closed. GAUGING MIKE GILLIS – PART 7: THE LUONGO/SCHNEIDER DEBACLE Looking back, it’s so blatantly obvious. When Roberto Luongo uttered the words, “It’s been a great six years, but it’s time to move on,” Mike Gillis should have listened. The Canucks should have traded Luongo that summer. In this ten-part story, Vancity Buzz breaks down the seminal moments of Gillis’ reign, offering pertinent insight into the defining moments of the franchise’s brightest period. We’ll take a look at it all: the good, the bad and the awkward. It was the the summer of 2012. Cory Schneider had been called upon to start Games 3, 4 and 5 of the first round series against the LA Kings after Luongo started and lost the first two. Schneider won only one, and the Canucks followed up their 2011 Finals run with a first round exit. A few weeks later, Gillis signed Schneider to a 3-year $12 million contract – a signing that signaled the direction Vancouver wished to pursue in net. The page had been turned on Luongo’s time with the Canucks. At least it should have been. What ensued was two years of Luongo being the most discussed name in the NHL, climaxing with the Cory Schneider trade at the 2013 NHL Entry Draft, and culminating with the Luongo trade in March 2014. Canucks fans were incensed by the two trades. Many still are. Vancouver, once blessed with two of the NHL’s best goaltenders, sat through two long years of trade rumours, for what? To end up with Bo Horvat (aquired for Schneider), Shawn Matthias and Jakob Markstrom (aquired for Luongo), and neither elite goalie. If you go back and examine the decisions Gillis made on the goaltending front, however, Gillis had little choice – not because of Luongo’s contract, but by how the situation unfolded. The Massive Contract Pegged by some as an albatross, Luongo himself said his deal “sucks”, and that it was the anchor that held back a potential trade. The truth is Luongo’s contract was brilliant when it was signed. Jay Adams broke it down in detail in Part 5 of this series. To summarize: Luongo’s 12-year deal allowed him to be one of the highest paid goaltenders in the NHL (deservedly so), while lowering the cap hit for the Canucks so they could build a team in front of him. The other peice of genius was contract’s “tail”: as soon as Luongo retired, the cap-hit would disappear from the NHL’s books. NHL Entry Draft 2012 Gillis’ first opportunity to fix goaltending log jam came mere months after that first round loss to the Kings at the 2012 NHL Entry Draft. Everyone knew Luongo’s first choice for a trade destination was Florida, but it was the Maple Leafs who put together a serious bid. Toronto, many believe, offered Tyler Bozak, Nazem Kadri, and a draft pick for Luongo at the time. A few months later, Damien Cox reported that Vancouver “got greedy” and turned down the deal, but it would later come out that Luongo was the one who used his veto power. Luongo’s thinking – hold out for Florida. Toronto’s offer will still be there at the trade deadline in April. With hindsight on their side, pundits look back and say the Luongo trade should’ve been consummated at that draft, but the deal was impossible to complete once Luongo used his no-trade clause to nix the best deal on the table. The 2012-13 season Still, being patient on the trade made sense at the time. Luongo was regarded as one of the best netminders in the world – one who could turn a team missing the playoffs into one that could make them and win a round or two. He had already proven that in Vancouver. Should any of the teams on Luongo’s list have a bad start to the season, you’d expect them to get desperate and put together an even better package than they offered at the draft. It might have gone that way had the NHL been operating as usual, but it wasn’t. The league locked out its players, closing its doors for three months, meaning three months of wasted time on the Luongo trade front for Mike Gillis. When reflecting on how long it took Gillis to trade Luongo, it’s rarely mentioned or remembered that half a season and all the pressure it would’ve put on Luongo’s suitors was lost with the lockout. The 2013 Trade Deadline Rumours swirled throughout the 2012-13 NHL lockout and as soon as the season began many reported that a potential deal was in place for Luongo. Andrew @searexx Follow So this is a thing... #luongo 10:18 AM - 2 Dec 2012 This may or may not have been true, but what we do know is the new CBA punished teams that had signed “back-diving” long term deals that lowered the overall cap hit. Unlike before, where a Luongo retirement would mean the contract (and cap hit) would effectively vanish, if he retired under the new rules, his team would have to pay a cap advantage recapture penalty. This rule change significantly hurt Luongo’s trade value. Once the season began in late January, Toronto received solid goaltending from James Reimer – he was 13-4-4 with a save percentage of .920 going into the trade deadline – dousing their urgency. At the 2013 deadline, the Leafs significantly dialed back their proposal from the previous summer, reportedly offering one draft pick and backup goalie Ben Scrivens, while asking Vancouver to eat some of the contract. Considering Vancouver believed themselves to be a Stanley Cup contender, trading Luongo for a worse backup and mediocre future returns made less sense than showing confidence in their core and keeping two strong goalies for another playoff run. (PITB’s Daniel Wagner made a strong argument about this.) NHL Entry Draft 2013 At the 2013 draft, something had to give. Offers for Luongo had gone downhill since the new CBA was signed – his contract, a brilliant piece of work when it was signed, was now a noose. After promising Schneider and Luongo the situation would change for a full year, keeping both starting goalies was not an option. But what happened after 12 months of listening to Luongo trade rumours came straight out of left field. Enter Gary Bettman announcing the 9th overall pick: “I think you’re going to want to hear this… New Jersey trades the 9th selection in the 2013 NHL Draft to Vancouver in exchange for goaltender Cory Schneider.” Vancouver chose to stick with Luongo and deal Schneider for the ninth pick that turned into Horvat. All of this was done without Luongo being notified, we soon found out. While Gillis was in New Jersey dealing Schneider to the home team, Canucks owner Francesco Aquilini was visiting Luongo at his house in Florida – pleading him to let bygones be bygones and telling the goalie how much he meant to the team. The truth was clear – faced with the option of respecting Luongo’s wish to set him free by buying out his contract, Canucks ownership couldn’t stomach the bill (2/3rds the amount remaining on the contract plus a cap hit). Instead, they dealt the goalie they’d thought would be their future, sticking with the one they’d rather have traded. The 2013-14 Season In the season following the Schneider trade, Luongo came back to reclaim his starting role once again. His request to be traded remained on Gillis’ table. When the season started, he was unwilling to talk about his future in Vancouver. Luongo appeared on Hockey Night in Canada’s After Hours on Nov. 23, 2013, and he explained why he said “my contract sucks” at the trade deadline a year before. “I meant what I said at the time. I didn’t say it out of anger or frustration. That’s just the way I felt.” “The duration kind of cornered me into the situation right now.” Luongo expressed relief, but opened up on how he felt sharing the net with Schneider. “The main thing is I get to be a starter again.” “The last year and a half was pretty tough for me. Even though I put on a good face, inside it was eating me up not being on the ice. That’s what made it easy to come back – to be able to play and be a starter again.” Just before the February Olympic break, Luongo began to sound like he was enjoying his role with the Canucks and might decide to stay. On January 30, interviewed by the Team 1040’s Matt Sekeres and Blake Price, he was asked if he’d be requesting a trade again in the summer, and he said he’d things were going well for him so he didn’t want to think about that. That was before the Heritage Classic of course, when all that happiness and momentum was halted. In the game Luongo had been looking forward to playing all season long, head coach John Tortorella chose to give Eddie Lack a third straight start, saying Lack gave the team the best chance to win. With the decision, the goaltending controversy many thought had been exorcised from Vancouver forever was brought back to life and Luongo wanted none of it. We all know what happened next, as Luongo turned up the heat on his trade demand from almost two years earlier and Gillis traded his second superstar goalie in nine months. Conclusion Had Luongo not vetoed the trade to Toronto in the summer of 2012, the Canucks would have likely received Tyler Bozak, Nazem Kadri, and a first round draft pick. Gillis would have had Schneider as his starter while adding depth at centre and in the pipeline. That road block, erected by Luongo himself, pushed his trade into the new CBA – a new dimension in which his contract “sucked”. So much did the contract suck under the new CBA that it caused an entire year of unnecessary heartache and uncertainty for both Luongo and Canucks fans. The person it may have sucked most for, though, is Mike Gillis. At the end of his tenure as GM of the Canucks, the way Gillis dealt with the Luongo-Schneider situation is seen as his most glaring transgression. So glaring it may have cost him his job. GAUGING MIKE GILLIS – PART 8: FIRING VIGNEAULT, HIRING TORTORELLA In the gun of every NHL general manager lies (at least) one bullet. Sometimes, there are two. For Glen Sather, there have been four (and counting). But every GM has at least one, usable (at their discretion) to remove an acting head coach in favor of “their guy”. In many cases, it’s used immediately. Yet, after taking the organizational reins in April 2008, Mike Gillis kept his bullet. He waited, and retained Alain Vigneault through five additional seasons (and three contract extensions), watching Vigneault guide the Canucks to five Northwest Division titles, two Presidents’ Trophies, and Game 7 of the Stanley Cup Finals. But in May 2013, after a first round sweep by the San Jose Sharks, Gillis fired the bullet. In doing so, he arguably laid the foundation for his own dismissal just eleven months later. In this ten-part story, Vancity Buzz breaks down the seminal moments of Gillis’ reign, offering pertinent insight into the defining moments of the franchise’s brightest period. We’ll take a look at it all: the good, the bad and the awkward. The Hire In April 2008, Alain Vigneault’s future in Vancouver was murky, at best. Despite being just ten months removed from a Jack Adams Trophy (and a franchise record of 49 wins in 2006-2007), the Canucks failed to reach the 2007-2008 postseason, effectively costing Dave Nonis his GM position. With the addition of the innovative (and seemingly unorthodox) Gillis, many felt Vigneault was next. Yet, ignoring the pressure to start anew, Gillis demonstrated incredible patience in engaging and assessing his coach, undertaking extensive meetings with Vigneault to determine a collective vision for the team. In the end, Gillis was certain he had his guy. A contract extension swiftly followed. “My first priority when taking over the job was to meet with Alain and ensure we shared the same philosophy about building an elite level team for now and for the future. Alain has done a very good job in his two years in Vancouver and I am confident that will continue.” The Success Gillis’ patience and foresight was rewarded, as Vigneault would amass five consecutive Northwest Division Titles, two Presidents’ Trophies, a Jack Adams nomination in 2011, and a Game 7 appearance in the 2010-2011 Stanley Cup Finals. En route, he’d become the winningest coach in Canuck history (with a record of 313-170-57), while establishing a close bond and respected reputation amongst the roster. Kevin Bieksa: When he came in here, he made everybody accountable… Star players were not treated like star players. Rookies and fourth-liners weren’t treated like that. Everybody was treated equal. Jason Garrison: Guys respected him and he respected the players… He was a good person, and I had no complaints at all. The Downfall With Vigneault’s unparalleled success came related expectations from ownership, management and fans. After the Canucks’ unexpected first-round elimination in the 2012 postseason, rumors persisted that Francesco Aquilini sought to make Vigneault accountable, demanding his removal. Once again, Gillis ensured that cooler heads prevailed, encouraging a debriefing period before extending Vigneault’s contract. “I feel very comfortable with Alain as a coach,” said Gillis. “I don’t know why you wouldn’t want somebody back that has done an excellent job and has the results to show for it. It gets exasperating sometimes. A lot of teams that are envious of where this team is in a lot of different ways and having a good head coach is one reason they’re envious.” “Alain has built a foundation of winning with this franchise and I feel he can continue to build on that foundation to achieve our ultimate goal.” But after an unexpected four-game sweep at the hands of the San Jose Sharks in the 2013 postseason, Gillis quickly fired Vigneault, and began the search for his replacement. The Fallout In the wake of Vigneault’s firing, local media and fans latched onto the idea of a “country club atmosphere”, facilitated by the head coach, being responsible for the team’s under-performance. Oddly enough, this clashed with (positive) comments Daniel Sedin would later make about Vigneault’s approach. “[Vigneault] didn’t come in and yell that much,” said Sedin. “Early on, he did. But these last four or five years, he left it up to us players to control the room, and I think we did a good job of that. In firing Vigneault, Gillis could hold someone else accountable for the team’s regression, deflecting attention from his inability to develop NHL players and improve an anemic offense that had scored just 24 goals in its last 16 playoff games (an average of 1.5 goals a game). In fact, Gillis called for a complete “reset” – a process that would include trading team MVP Cory Schneider and buying-out peripheral defenceman Keith Ballard. But most importantly, by firing Vigneault, Gillis married himself to whoever the Canucks’ next head coach would be. In hockey terms, this was “his guy”. The Hire/The Fire In bringing John Tortorella to the fishbowl of Vancouver, Gillis demonstrated a clear desire for an authoritarian figure to cull the laid back, passive atmosphere seemingly responsible for the Canucks’ recent failures. The signing caught headlines, and represented a stark departure from Gillis’ understated, progressive nature. Ten months later, the Canucks would sit 12th in the Western Conference. Henrik Sedin would have his lowest full-season point total since 2003-2004, while Daniel would have his lowest since 2002-2003. Roberto Luongo, after being denied the opportunity to play in February’s Heritage Classic, would be a Florida Panther. Ryan Kesler, stripped of his assistant captaincy, would want out of Vancouver. The team would finish the year with its lowest full-season point total since 1999-2000, and their season-ticket-waitlist would effectively vanish. Less than three years after receiving the NHL General Manager of the Year Award (and two years removed from consecutive Presidents’ Trophies), Mike Gillis would be fired on April 8, 2014. A month later, with four years remaining on his contract, John Tortorella would follow. Alain Vigneault, meanwhile, was preparing the New York Rangers for a playoff run that would take them to the 2013-2014 Stanley Cup Finals. Sadly, Gillis could only blame himself. Conclusion Local media quickly pegged the Aquilini family, rather than Gillis, as the impetus behind the Tortorella hire (a fact the Aquilinis have vehemently denied). But even if the Aquilinis were largely responsible, this still falls on Gillis. By firing Vigneault, Gillis had to know that the next hire would determine his future. Without absolute certainty of who that person would be, Gillis was effectively operating without a plan. He was firing Vigneault to protect himself, rather than improve the team with a better coach. Simply put, without the Vigneault firing, there is no chance for the Tortorella debacle. Gillis’ move set the table for the events that followed. The logic of “the team simply needed a change” falls short if there is no clear blueprint for the future. If Tortorella’s disastrous tenure proved anything, it was that Gillis didn’t have the pieces to succeed at an elite level. As such (and noting much of the roster’s regression in 2013-2014), there is a compelling case that Vigneault actually maximized the production of the Canucks’ core and remained the best person for the position. Of course, Vigneault wasn’t perfect. His seemingly overbearing approach to injury issues aggravated relationships with Ryan Kesler, Willie Mitchell and Cody Hodgson. That’s indisputable. But how many players actually thrived after Vigneault’s departure? How many regressed? When you do the math, maybe Vigneault knew this team better than Gillis. GAUGING MIKE GILLIS – PART 9: TIRELESS BEHIND-THE-SCENES EFFORTS Most critics argue Mike Gillis’s creation of the best Canucks team ever was not rocket science. He took an existing core of players, added key pieces, and watched as it ascended the standings. Simple stuff. What people didn’t see is all the engineering that went on beneath the surface. Maybe it wasn’t “rocket science” but Vancouver’s “hockey science” pushed the team to higher heights. In this article, we delve into the behind the scenes activities undertaken by Gillis’s management group. In this ten-part story, Vancity Buzz breaks down the seminal moments of Gillis’ reign, offering pertinent insight into the defining moments of the franchise’s brightest period. We’ll take a look at it all: the good, the bad and the awkward. Upon being introduced as GM in 2008, Gillis said he hoped to bring a “different perspective” to running an NHL team. In 2011, Gillis told Bruce Dowbiggin, author of Ice Storm: The Rise and Fall of the Greatest Vancouver Canucks Team Ever, his approach on managing the Canucks. “I built a game plan and I decided there was no detail too small to worry about, because it might give us an edge.” Gillis appeared on the Team 1040 (now TSN 1040) in 2012 and discussed his research on the performance of athletes (transcribed by CanucksArmy.com). “I’ve been working on a human performance plan… I think fatigue was the first stage in it, about how you deal with the ups and downs. One of the things I’ve concluded is that compounded with the types of games that we play and the pressure – we have to find a better way to deal with that, and we have to find it quickly.” Curtailing fatigue According to Dowbiggin, the Canucks sleep at home 50 percent of the time during the season, while a northeastern team sleeps on the road only a “few dozen” times. Flying between NHL cities, as Vancouver does for all road trips, takes a much greater toll on the body than the bus and train rides eastern teams endure. Gillis hired a company called Fatigue Science to study Canucks players’ sleep patterns. During the 2011 run to the Finals, NHL writer Dan Rosen wrote an article chronicling the company’s work with the team. The Vancouver-based company had players wear wristbands while they slept, measuring time spent in a deep sleep versus a light sleep. From Rosen’s article: Fatigue Science then runs the data through its software to advise the Canucks on the best approach to travel, practice, eating habits and even determining who should room with who in the hotel. Alain Vigneault, then head coach of the team, spoke about the sleep research in Rosen’s article: “Because we travel the most in the NHL, that’s one of the reasons why we try to get a scientific approach to where our guys would have the utmost energy.” “I do think that, combined with both Roger (Takahashi) and Glenn (Carnegie) monitoring our conditioning the way they do, it certainly seems to be beneficial.” Rosen cited Vancouver’s road record (27-10-4) and their third period dominance (100 goals for vs. 58 against) as signs they had conquered exhaustion with help from Fatigue Science. A new “office” for the players In 2009, the Canucks hired Gateway Architecture to design a new dressing room facility – one that could serve as a home base for the players. The dressing room itself was an oval, instead of the standard rectangular shape. According to Dowbiggin, the goal was to create sightlines between each player. The rest of the facility included a kitchen, players’ lounge where they could get away from media, wi-fi area, and a new whirlpool. Yes, hot-tubbing makes you play better hockey. In an article for Canucks.com, Harvey Jones, Canucks manager of arena operations said the new area received league-wide attention as soon as other teams saw it. “We had a call from a guy in Ottawa saying ‘what the heck did you do, my boss just came in here and said to find out what the guys in Vancouver did because all the players are talking about wonderful things you’re doing for the players and the new dressing room.’ Word is getting out all over.” The kitchen came with team chef, David Speight, who worked with each player, preparing meals, and even conducting cooking classes to help them prepare their own healthy meals. The mind room One of Gillis’s most often joked about innovations was the “Mind Room” – a top-secret space reserved for the study of stress and its effects on the players. According to the Bio-Medical website: The Mind Room (using instruments from Thought Technology) uses biofeedback and neurofeedback instruments to assess and train athletes to control their stress and attention in competitive situations. Biofeedback uses physiological measures of muscle tension (EMG), skin perspiration (GSR), temperature , respiration and heart rate variability. Neurofeedback, or EEG biofeedback assesses unhealthy brainwave (EEG) patterns to determine if an athlete is anxious, in the peak attention zone or over-focused and trains their brain to be able to maintain the optimal pattern required for peak performance. Gillis, who himself had read studies on how stress affected performance, told Dowbiggin: “The worst thing you can do on a game day is show an athlete images of his opponent succeeding.” – it increases stress. “On the other hand, positive coaching results in adrenaline being produced. “So on a game day or at intermission, we’ll try to stress the positive aspects of a situation we faced in a game. If we’re behind, we’ll show how our team has come from behind in the past. If an opposing goalie is playing well, we’ll find video showing us scoring on him in the past.” In 2011, Gillis and team owner Francesco Aquilini went as far as convincing Bruno Demichelis of Chelsea Football Club to come work for the Canucks. A past employee of AC Milan, Demichelis had created a sports science centre called MilanLab, with the aim of optimizing “physio-physical” management of athletes. The Demichelis plan never got off the ground, though, as he was unable to obtain a Canadian work permit, according to Dowbiggin’s book. Other reports say this is not the true story of why it was cancelled. Player utilization Like with any sports team, much of the product seen on playing field, or ice in this instance, was a result of a carefully crafted game plan. One way the Canucks’ plan differed in contrast to those of other teams was through the way its players were deployed. Cam Charron, then a writer on the Province Blog (now a member of the Toronto Maple Leafs’ famous analytics team), noticed and wrote about this. He noted that Vancouver’s most offensive players, particularly the Sedins, were given a majority of faceoffs in the offensive end, while its more defensive lines took draws at the other end. Simply put, Vancouver does this more evidently than any other team in the National Hockey League. The fact that it’s been unnoticed by so many media members and fans in Vancouver is getting to be not even funny anymore. It was a crazy swing last year and getting more evident this season. Results In 2012, Charron wrote in-depth (and in nerd-speak) about the Canucks improved performance under Mike Gillis: The big improvement for the Canucks in the last four years is in the third period. Pythagorean Expectation predicted 50 wins from the Canucks in the Gillis era per year (actual, 49.8) and 43.2 in the four previous seasons (actual, 43.3). That’s an increase of 16%. But where did the increase come from? They actually lost ground in the second period, their win expectancy dipping by 8% in the middle frame in the Gillis era, but that’s propped up by a 23% gain in the first period and a 35% increase in the third period. The Canucks were an incredible third period team during those years of dominance, and they did it on the backs of two players over the age of 30 (the Sedins). That Gillis left no stone unturned cannot be argued – he even went as far as collaborating with UCLA to create a sports drink that responded to the specifics of playing in a sea-level environment and heavy travel, according to Dowbiggin’s book. We don’t know if Gillis’s scientific approach helped the team, but we do know the Canucks won two straight Presidents’ Trophies and made it to Game 7 of the Stanley Cup Finals. And we know he did everything he could think of doing behind the scenes. GAUGING MIKE GILLIS – PART 10: TRADING LUONGO In many ways, Mike Gillis served as a magician throughout his six-year tenure in Vancouver. He revealed new ways of thinking, promoted new modes of evaluation, and produced staggering results. He also made two franchise goaltenders disappear. But Gillis’ biggest flaw wasn’t actually trading Roberto Luongo. More accurately, it was his inability to control a problem of riches (and a related lack of tact in dealing with the franchise’s greatest goaltender) that ultimately tarnished his legacy. Earlier this month, The Province writer Jason Botchford summed up Luongo’s career in Vancouver as a controversy riddled loop that would inevitably persist, and therefore never work: What if Cory Schneider was traded in 2011? What if Luongo started Game 3 in the 2012 playoffs? What if he won Game 7 in the Stanley Cup final? That was the thing with Luongo and Vancouver. No matter how many times he bounced back from a slight, there was always another Heritage Classic, another insult, around the next corner. Looking back, there is no way he was ever going to spend the rest of his career in Vancouver. On its face, Botchford’s statement is absolutely correct. Luongo’s tenure did follow a seemingly consistent pattern of: (i) lack of appreciation; (ii) trigger event; (iii) professional/resilient response by Luongo; (iv) temporary honeymoon period; (v) repeat. But it would be remiss to suggest that this pattern made Luongo a poor fit for Vancouver or somehow responsible for the perpetual roller coaster. In reality, it was Mike Gillis’ inability to curb dramatic situations (and tendency to exacerbate them) that facilitated the unhealthy, systemic issue. In particular, three events come to mind. 2012 Playoffs – Game 3 In April 2012, on the heels of their second consecutive Presidents’ Trophy, Vancouver entered the postseason seemingly destined for a deep run. Despite two solid performances by Luongo, the Canucks found themselves down two-games-to-none, with pressure mounting to start Cory Schneider in game 3. Analytics guru Cam Charron weighed in on the controversy: And, come on. Has Luongo been the problem for the team? With 65 shots against and just 4 goals, to be even in this series, you’re counting on your goaltender to have a .938 save percentage just to be tied through two games. Luongo’s even strength save percentage is at .951, his problems resulting from poor goal support, five-on-five defence and an atrocious powerplay. Nonetheless, head coach Alain Vigneault (whose goaltending decisions necessitated Gillis’ input) opted for Schneider in game 3 despite insisting that “being down 2-0 is not a reflection of the goaltending we’ve had“. A week later, the Canucks were out of the playoffs and Schneider assumed the role of number one goaltender (signing a 3 year/$12M extension on June 29). When asked about Schneider at his season-ending press conference, Gillis noted: It wasn’t by accident he was played in big games. We wanted to see if he was as good as we thought. He is. The emergence of Cory as such an outstanding young goalie has changed the landscape. When later asked about trading Luongo, Gillis did little to curb the emerging situation, noting that “multiple teams” were interested – publicly fueling media speculation that Luongo would be dealt. In doing so, Gillis demonstrated a complete lack of foresight. Rather than publicly affirm “our team and plan is built around two goaltenders, and we’re keeping both”, Gillis narrowed his options – locking himself into Schneider, distancing himself from Luongo, and cutting his leverage his half. 2013 Offseason A potential Luongo trade would be stymied by retroactive sanctions in the 2013 collective bargaining agreement, forcing the veteran to awkwardly return to Vancouver as the team’s back-up goalie. This awkwardness was magnified by consistent coverage of potential Luongo trades, which Gillis publicly facilitated and encouraged. Nonetheless, Luongo accepted his role as the team’s back-up, supporting Schneider and downplaying the situation with a remarkable sense of humour. After a potential deal to Toronto fell apart in April 2013, Luongo accepted a perpetual state of uncertainty; remaining committed to the organization despite an ongoing media circus. In the opening round of the 2013 postseason, Luongo turned in solid performances against the San Jose Sharks before being replaced (again) by Schneider in games three and four. Sharks captain Joe Thornton questioned the move. We felt Lou was playing great…we felt we were lucky not to play against Lou, to be honest. After being swept in four games, Gillis declared it “unlikely” that Luongo would be back, offering the goaltender an apparent assurance that closure was coming. Shortly thereafter, Luongo listed his Yaletown condo for sale. Seven weeks later, without any dialogue or discussion with Luongo, Gillis abruptly traded Cory Schneider to the New Jersey Devils. James Duthie ✔ @tsnjamesduthie Follow Roberto Luongo: "I'm shocked! I have to let this sink in and figure out what I'm going to do." 3:00 PM - 30 Jun 2013 Surprisingly, Gillis failed to appreciate the impact of the move on Luongo. I need to have a conversation with him, explain what happened. I’m not anticipating there being issues. Naturally, Luongo felt differently. I wasn’t angry, I was just shocked mostly. I was just trying to figure out the reasons (shrugs). Why a decision like that would be made, especially without consulting me. I mean, that’s a pretty big move, I thought, to make without having an input from the guy you’re going to put your trust in. 2014 Heritage Classic With incredibly thick skin, Luongo returned to Vancouver for the 2013-2014 season. In addition to realizing on-ice success (posting a 2.38 GAA and .917 SV% in 42 games), Luongo took personal steps to re-establish Vancouver as home. Sir Canuckles @SirCanuckles @botchford after reading the provies - you think it's fair to say that, by January, Lu was happier here than Kes? Jason Botchford @botchford Follow @SirCanuckles That's a given. Before the Heritage debacle, 1 was house shopping in Van 8:31 AM - 21 Nov 2014 That is, until the 2014 Heritage Classic. Hosted at Vancouver’s BC Place Stadium, the “outdoor” game marked the highlight of Vancouver’s schedule, and represented a significant opportunity for Luongo. There’s no hiding it. I did want to play that game. Despite knowing his franchise goaltender was “pissed” with the decision, coach John Tortorella opted to start rookie goaltender Eddie Lack in front of 54,000+ confused spectators and a nationwide audience. By the middle of the second period, “we want Lu!” chants echoed through the stadium, as cameras focused on Luongo sitting helplessly on Vancouver’s bench. Two days later, Luongo was a Florida Panther. Iain MacIntyre @imacVanSun Follow Luongo: "I thought my contract was untradeable. Just when I was starting to let my guard down, the trade happens. Go figure. " 2:27 PM - 4 Mar 2014 The kicker? Vancouver would retain 15% of Luongo’s salary (roughly $790,000 per year against the cap) for the remaining eight years of his contract. Gillis had actually paid for Luongo to play elsewhere. Even in his absence, the Vancouver/Luongo drama would continue. One month later, Gillis was fired. This season, Luongo is an NHL All-Star, with a 2.32 GAA and .923 SV% as a member of the Florida Panthers. Conclusion Ultimately, it’s impossible to remember Luongo’s tenure in Vancouver without the related drama. As Jason Botchford correctly noted, there was always a “Heritage Classic around the corner”. But why? Luongo’s captaincy in 2008 drew attention and criticism, but it was a move Gillis championed. The choice to start Cory Schneider in the 2012 postseason can be hung on Alain Vigneault, but that argument is weakened if such decisions were made in advance and with Gillis’ input. The ongoing controversy with Schneider was a constant distraction, but it was largely fueled by Gillis’ suggestion that Luongo would be traded. If Gillis had simply said “we’re comfortable with the situation, we want both guys and we’re keeping them”, he could have explored all options (privately) without many of the public hassles. The decision to trade Cory Schneider in June 2013 created significant drama, but was entirely the product of: (i) Gillis’ public declaration that Luongo would be traded (compromising all leverage); (ii) Gillis’ failure to consult Luongo when the plan changed; and (iii) Gillis’ reluctance to seriously pursue a Schneider trade in 2011, 2012 or early 2013. In terms of the Heritage Classic, it seems unfathomable that – after all that had transpired – Gillis would not have the influence or foresight to curb the decision to start Eddie Lack. As such, we’re left to conclude that Gillis failed to appreciate (or truly understand) a situation that captivated Vancouver’s media market for nearly three seasons. If you remove Mike Gillis from the entire Luongo ordeal, you have to wonder if things would’ve been different. It’s hard to imagine they wouldn’t. If you’re looking for a case study on how not to treat a player, Roberto Luongo’s tenure in Vancouver is a good place to start. As a member of the Canucks, Luongo’s on-ice accomplishments were virtually unparalleled. Six Northwest Division titles. Two Presidents’ Trophies. Two Vezina nominations. One Hart Trophy nomination. One Lester B. Pearson nomination. One Jennings Trophy. Two team MVPs. An appearance in game 7 of the Stanley Cup Finals. A record of 275-140-50. But perhaps most notably, his tenure reflected the total mismanagement of an elite player and loyal teammate by general manager Mike Gillis. This lack of awareness and tact, with Gillis at the helm, boiled over on March 4, 2014, as Luongo was abruptly dealt to the Florida Panthers for Jacob Markstrom and Shawn Matthias in the aftermath of the Heritage Classic. One month later, Gillis was fired as Vancouver’s GM. It wasn’t a coincidence. In this ten-part story, Vancity Buzz breaks down the seminal moments of Gillis’ reign, offering pertinent insight into the defining moments of the franchise’s brightest period. We’ll take a look at it all: the good, the bad and the awkward. Blast to the past. A crazy recap on MG's tenure in Vancouver. I'm more than content with Benning and Linden in charge of hockey ops now, and even though it was MG's time to go, man, did he work his butt off for this team going to every end possible to gain the slightest of advantages. There's an old saying you don't know what you have until it's gone, and man, looking back at MG's reign from this 10 part series, throughout the ups and downs, you gain a renewed appreciation of what he did here. If you have time, I'd recommend you give it a go. Boatload of information and you'll come to realization how great we were then. Edit:the spoilers are messed up for whatever reason (I've checked and they're good on my part) so just disregard. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Rick Grimes Posted February 3, 2015 Share Posted February 3, 2015 This is going to be a long, and awesome read, just finished part 1. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Toni Zamboni Posted February 3, 2015 Share Posted February 3, 2015 thats a long post my man Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Squeak Posted February 4, 2015 Share Posted February 4, 2015 It was a good series. They've been putting out good stuff on vancitybuzz this year. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Mathew Barzal Posted February 4, 2015 Share Posted February 4, 2015 Yeah, he's going to be remembered for how he &^@#ed up. But IMO the way he assembled the team for the Cup run was a stroke of genius. Shame that injuries dismantled us. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
CRAZY_4_NAZZY Posted February 4, 2015 Share Posted February 4, 2015 Sigh that era was equally fun and painful to be part of Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
JamesB Posted February 4, 2015 Share Posted February 4, 2015 Long post or short book. My read on Gillis is shorter. He had the good fortune to join the Canucks when the best 2-man forward combo in the league was young. And some other good young players were in the system, including Kesler and Edler. And he had a good goalie and a good coach. He rode their coattails as the young guys went through standard age-related improvement. Like all gms he made some good moves (Ehrhoff, Hamhuis) and some bad moves (Ballard, Booth, terrible drafting). On the whole the bad moves outnumber the good moves and overall his moves probably hurt the team. I would surprised if he gets another GM job at the NHL level. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Crackers Posted February 4, 2015 Share Posted February 4, 2015 thats a long post my man Why did you need to quote it??? Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Ronalds.Kenins41 Posted February 4, 2015 Share Posted February 4, 2015 The parts I was most interested in were the parts most of us don't know a great deal of detail about. Especially this one, the others we all kind of know about. Most critics argue Mike Gillis’s creation of the best Canucks team ever was not rocket science. He took an existing core of players, added key pieces, and watched as it ascended the standings. Simple stuff. What people didn’t see is all the engineering that went on beneath the surface. Maybe it wasn’t “rocket science” but Vancouver’s “hockey science” pushed the team to higher heights. In this article, we delve into the behind the scenes activities undertaken by Gillis’s management group. In this ten-part story, Vancity Buzz breaks down the seminal moments of Gillis’ reign, offering pertinent insight into the defining moments of the franchise’s brightest period. We’ll take a look at it all: the good, the bad and the awkward. Upon being introduced as GM in 2008, Gillis said he hoped to bring a “different perspective” to running an NHL team. In 2011, Gillis told Bruce Dowbiggin, author of Ice Storm: The Rise and Fall of the Greatest Vancouver Canucks Team Ever, his approach on managing the Canucks. “I built a game plan and I decided there was no detail too small to worry about, because it might give us an edge.” Gillis appeared on the Team 1040 (now TSN 1040) in 2012 and discussed his research on the performance of athletes (transcribed by CanucksArmy.com). “I’ve been working on a human performance plan… I think fatigue was the first stage in it, about how you deal with the ups and downs. One of the things I’ve concluded is that compounded with the types of games that we play and the pressure – we have to find a better way to deal with that, and we have to find it quickly.” Curtailing fatigue According to Dowbiggin, the Canucks sleep at home 50 percent of the time during the season, while a northeastern team sleeps on the road only a “few dozen” times. Flying between NHL cities, as Vancouver does for all road trips, takes a much greater toll on the body than the bus and train rides eastern teams endure. Gillis hired a company called Fatigue Science to study Canucks players’ sleep patterns. During the 2011 run to the Finals, NHL writer Dan Rosen wrote an article chronicling the company’s work with the team. The Vancouver-based company had players wear wristbands while they slept, measuring time spent in a deep sleep versus a light sleep. From Rosen’s article: Fatigue Science then runs the data through its software to advise the Canucks on the best approach to travel, practice, eating habits and even determining who should room with who in the hotel. Alain Vigneault, then head coach of the team, spoke about the sleep research in Rosen’s article: “Because we travel the most in the NHL, that’s one of the reasons why we try to get a scientific approach to where our guys would have the utmost energy.” “I do think that, combined with both Roger (Takahashi) and Glenn (Carnegie) monitoring our conditioning the way they do, it certainly seems to be beneficial.” Rosen cited Vancouver’s road record (27-10-4) and their third period dominance (100 goals for vs. 58 against) as signs they had conquered exhaustion with help from Fatigue Science. A new “office” for the players In 2009, the Canucks hired Gateway Architecture to design a new dressing room facility – one that could serve as a home base for the players. The dressing room itself was an oval, instead of the standard rectangular shape. According to Dowbiggin, the goal was to create sightlines between each player. The rest of the facility included a kitchen, players’ lounge where they could get away from media, wi-fi area, and a new whirlpool. Yes, hot-tubbing makes you play better hockey. In an article for Canucks.com, Harvey Jones, Canucks manager of arena operations said the new area received league-wide attention as soon as other teams saw it. “We had a call from a guy in Ottawa saying ‘what the heck did you do, my boss just came in here and said to find out what the guys in Vancouver did because all the players are talking about wonderful things you’re doing for the players and the new dressing room.’ Word is getting out all over.” The kitchen came with team chef, David Speight, who worked with each player, preparing meals, and even conducting cooking classes to help them prepare their own healthy meals. The mind room One of Gillis’s most often joked about innovations was the “Mind Room” – a top-secret space reserved for the study of stress and its effects on the players. According to the Bio-Medical website: The Mind Room (using instruments from Thought Technology) uses biofeedback and neurofeedback instruments to assess and train athletes to control their stress and attention in competitive situations. Biofeedback uses physiological measures of muscle tension (EMG), skin perspiration (GSR), temperature , respiration and heart rate variability. Neurofeedback, or EEG biofeedback assesses unhealthy brainwave (EEG) patterns to determine if an athlete is anxious, in the peak attention zone or over-focused and trains their brain to be able to maintain the optimal pattern required for peak performance. Gillis, who himself had read studies on how stress affected performance, told Dowbiggin: “The worst thing you can do on a game day is show an athlete images of his opponent succeeding.” – it increases stress. “On the other hand, positive coaching results in adrenaline being produced. “So on a game day or at intermission, we’ll try to stress the positive aspects of a situation we faced in a game. If we’re behind, we’ll show how our team has come from behind in the past. If an opposing goalie is playing well, we’ll find video showing us scoring on him in the past.” In 2011, Gillis and team owner Francesco Aquilini went as far as convincing Bruno Demichelis of Chelsea Football Club to come work for the Canucks. A past employee of AC Milan, Demichelis had created a sports science centre called MilanLab, with the aim of optimizing “physio-physical” management of athletes. The Demichelis plan never got off the ground, though, as he was unable to obtain a Canadian work permit, according to Dowbiggin’s book. Other reports say this is not the true story of why it was cancelled. Player utilization Like with any sports team, much of the product seen on playing field, or ice in this instance, was a result of a carefully crafted game plan. One way the Canucks’ plan differed in contrast to those of other teams was through the way its players were deployed. Cam Charron, then a writer on the Province Blog (now a member of the Toronto Maple Leafs’ famous analytics team), noticed and wrote about this. He noted that Vancouver’s most offensive players, particularly the Sedins, were given a majority of faceoffs in the offensive end, while its more defensive lines took draws at the other end. Simply put, Vancouver does this more evidently than any other team in the National Hockey League. The fact that it’s been unnoticed by so many media members and fans in Vancouver is getting to be not even funny anymore. It was a crazy swing last year and getting more evident this season. Results In 2012, Charron wrote in-depth (and in nerd-speak) about the Canucks improved performance under Mike Gillis: The big improvement for the Canucks in the last four years is in the third period. Pythagorean Expectation predicted 50 wins from the Canucks in the Gillis era per year (actual, 49.8) and 43.2 in the four previous seasons (actual, 43.3). That’s an increase of 16%. But where did the increase come from? They actually lost ground in the second period, their win expectancy dipping by 8% in the middle frame in the Gillis era, but that’s propped up by a 23% gain in the first period and a 35% increase in the third period. The Canucks were an incredible third period team during those years of dominance, and they did it on the backs of two players over the age of 30 (the Sedins). That Gillis left no stone unturned cannot be argued – he even went as far as collaborating with UCLA to create a sports drink that responded to the specifics of playing in a sea-level environment and heavy travel, according to Dowbiggin’s book. We don’t know if Gillis’s scientific approach helped the team, but we do know the Canucks won two straight Presidents’ Trophies and made it to Game 7 of the Stanley Cup Finals. And we know he did everything he could think of doing behind the scenes. The late Pat Quinn is viewed as a hero in this city and for good reason. I have written about all the great things he did for the Vancouver Canucks. But when he was fired in 1997, the Canucks were a team that had missed the playoffs the previous year and were in disarray. The team did not have a legitimate starting goaltender and did not have a legitimate first line centre. He didn’t have a particularly great drafting record and he angered Pavel Bure enough to make him want to leave town. He let Cliff Ronning and Geoff Courtnall walk for nothing in free agency and he held onto players like Jyrki Lumme, Dana Murzyn and Dave Babych for too long. That’s obviously a cynical way to look at Pat Quinn’s tenure in Vancouver, but that’s also the way Mike Gillis is unfairly viewed. He was far from perfect but he did some good things and he helped produce some of the best hockey this city has ever seen. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
-DLC- Posted February 4, 2015 Share Posted February 4, 2015 Do NOT quote it as it's far too long and makes it difficult to go through the thread. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
hsedin33 Posted February 4, 2015 Share Posted February 4, 2015 I'll always remember him as that guy who came in and built a masterpiece, then single handedly took a sledgehammer and smashed every piece of it to unfixable smithereens. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Ronalds.Kenins41 Posted February 4, 2015 Share Posted February 4, 2015 Do NOT quote it as it's far too long and makes it difficult to go through the thread. yup I only quoted one part (the good part that most have no clue of) Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
BanTSN Posted February 4, 2015 Share Posted February 4, 2015 I wonder if the Sedins would have blossomed so much without Sundin's influence. Probably. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Salmonberries Posted February 4, 2015 Share Posted February 4, 2015 A ten parter eh? Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
bigbadcanucks Posted February 4, 2015 Share Posted February 4, 2015 Awesome read. Thanks for posting. For all the good that Gillis did, it's too bad that his lasting legacy was how everything seemingly unraveled after the cup run in 2011. I for one thought the Luongo contract when it was signed was an unbelievably clever deal constructed by Gillis and Lupien. How could have anyone foreseen the "Luongo clause" to take effect when the deal was signed? Gillis was an innovator. Too bad he ended being so bad on the PR front. For a guy trained as a lawyer, he sure didn't display a lot of discretion when publicly discussing goalie-gate. I would like to have known more about what Gillis was thinking when he pulled the plug on Manny's career in Vancouver. I'm convinced that Gillis was doing the best to protect Manny (especially given the way his own hockey career ended), but I have no evidence of it other than Gillis' history of safeguarding players as an Agent and as a Plaintiff in the Alan Eagleson case. Was a great read. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Robongo Posted February 4, 2015 Share Posted February 4, 2015 I made a thread when it started but nobody seemed to really care and gave up on updating it lol http://forum.canucks.com/topic/365464-gauging-mike-gillis-a-10-part-series-by-vancity-buzz/ Thanks for posting the rest though Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
bohonos76 Posted February 4, 2015 Share Posted February 4, 2015 Everyone makes mistakes... Although I didn't mind Gillis I am glad he's gone and I'm glad we have Jim Benning now... though you really have to shake your head on his Tyler Sequin trade.... Thankfully that is not Canuck related... Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Haikara Posted February 4, 2015 Share Posted February 4, 2015 He brought a lot to the organization, too bad he was too patient with moving some of the assets (Luongo, Booth, etc). His last few moves are looking good at the moment (Horvat, Kenins, Matthias, Markstrom). Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Riviera82 Posted February 4, 2015 Share Posted February 4, 2015 Gillis did a lot of good things, Gillis did a lot of stupid things, we still have no cup and it does not look like that will change soon. Nevertheless, that was a great read and it brought back a lot of great memories. The 09/10 through 10/11 seasons were so much fun to watch, until June 15 2011 of course That's when the great times ended in my opinion. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
MoneypuckOverlord Posted February 4, 2015 Share Posted February 4, 2015 Mike gillis did more good then bad, it's sad he's in Vancouver, if he was in Nashville or New Jersey he still be around, he missed the playoffs once, out of 7 consecutive successful seasons. We'll see how benning does. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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